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DEVELOPING FINANCIAL MARKETS 
ABSTRACT AND INTRODUCTION 
 
Central banks have an interest in well-functioning money markets, foreign exchange markets, and 
secondary markets for government securities.  Efficient financial markets support both the monetary 
stability and financial stability goals of the central bank;  and more broadly should benefit economic 
development. 
 
Well-functioning money markets support the transmission of an interest-rate based monetary policy and 
can provide information to the central bank.  Liquid foreign exchange markets can help to stabilise the 
exchange rate and reduce transaction costs in cross-border trade and transfers.  The development of 
these markets will support the later introduction of related financial markets such as repo and 
derivatives, which should in turn lead to improved risk management and financial stability, thereby 
enhancing economic welfare.  Liquidity and price stability in short-term interest rate markets can 
support market-making, and thus liquidity in the securities markets.  This in turn should reduce the cost 
of issuance for the government and other fixed-interest issuers.  Indeed the secondary market for 
government securities may act as a catalyst for wider fixed income securities markets development:  its 
yield curve is the benchmark for the pricing of the private sector credit.   The advancement of these 
markets should be accompanied by the development of the appropriate market infrastructure such as 
robust payment and settlement systems and supportive legal framework.   
 
Many developing economies are characterised by illiquidity in these core markets, and in most cases a 
surplus of central bank money, in the form of excess commercial bank balances with the central bank.  
This handbook will look at what the central bank, and the Ministry of Finance as issuer of government 





1.  Definitions and background 
Money markets 
 
The term ‘money markets’ normally refers to the wholesale (ie large value) trading of short-term funds, 
on an uncollateralised basis;   but it could include collateralised trading eg  the short-term repo market.  
The major participants in the money markets will normally be banks;   but other companies with large 
amounts of cash to manage on a short-term basis-such as securities companies, possibly insurance 
companies, investment or pension funds-may also participate.  The interbank market is thus strictly 
speaking a subset of the money market, but the term may be used loosely to encompass non-bank 
wholesale participants as well as banks.  Perhaps the key concept here is that of short-term liquidity 
management of wholesale funds. 
 
In many countries, the interbank market equates to a market in central bank money (‘Fed funds’ in the 
United States).  A bank with temporary excess balances on account at the central bank (earning no or a 
below-market interest rate) might seek to deposit with/lend to another bank which has a temporary 
shortage of central bank money.  The interest rate at which banks trade central bank balances will be the 
interbank rate.  (For central banks using interest rate levers, the short-term tactical target of monetary 
operations is normally a short-term interbank interest rate.)  But in some countries, not all banks have 
transactional accounts at the central bank, in which case their participation in the interbank market may 
not involve central bank balances.  Similarly, non-bank companies which trade in the money markets 
will not be trading central bank balances.  In this Handbook, the term ‘money markets’ will be used to 
denote interbank trading of central bank balances.  In the absence of substantial market segmentation, 
the distinction between interbank and money markets should not affect the discussion. 
 
Most central banks operate in the money markets as part of their monetary policy operations and hence 
have a vested interest in ensuring that these markets operate effectively.   The transmission of the policy 
rate into the financial markets and wider economy normally operates via the short end of the yield curve 
ie  in the money markets; and normally the central bank aims to steer directly only the very short-term 
part of the yield curve, perhaps out to two weeks or a month.  Repo using government securities has 
become the instrument of choice for many central banks in their dealing with commercial bank 
counterparties, where there is a shortage of liquidity.  Where there is a surplus, deposit auctions or the 
issuance of central bank bills are common.  But in both cases, the intention is to influence short-term 
money market interest rates (the operational lever is different, but the tactical target is the same). 
  
Foreign exchange markets 
 
While development of market pricing and trading in money markets and securities markets typically 
starts in the wholesale arena, foreign exchange trading normally occurs first in the retail market-
possibly as simply as cash trades on the street.  These markets can be very efficient for meeting retail 
needs:   it is common to see in developing markets a widespread presence of foreign exchange traders 
on the street, with very narrow spreads (frequently much narrower than in developed markets), and with 
no evidence of segmentation (prices and spreads may vary marginally, but there is no arbitrage 
opportunity in the pricing).  The challenge may then be to move part of the market-that part which 
supports larger-value transactions-from a cash-based arena to a non-cash one, which can facilitate 
regional or cross-border transfers and provide a good audit trail, but without imposing excessive costs. 




A move to book-entry foreign exchange trading for the wholesale market also makes it much easier for 
the central bank to participate on a transparent and efficient basis, whether to influence the exchange 
rate, or using foreign exchange as collateral in domestic currency operations.  If the central bank is 
perceived to be influencing the price in a non-transparent way, market uncertainty will be increased, but 
transparency is very difficult, if not impossible, if central bank operations are restricted to the cash 
market.   And standing facilities which required the physical counting and verification of large amounts 
of cash might in practice prove to be unusable when needed.   
Government and central bank securities markets 
 
The primary market for a security is the place where an issuer creates the security and sells it into the 
market.  This may be done in a variety of ways where the issuer is a government - auction, tap sales, use 
of underwriting consortium or other market intermediaries;   but it always involves the creation of new 
securities and the government as seller.  Primary market sales perform the function of covering a 
government’s financing deficit. 
 
The secondary market for securities covers trading of the securities after issuance and before 
redemption.  There is no requirement for the issuer to be involved in secondary trading as a 
counterparty, although such a role is possible.  The authorities cannot be net sellers of securities in the 
secondary market over time, although they may be net purchasers, as they can only sell in the secondary 
market securities which have first been bought back from that market.  The secondary market cannot 
therefore be used to finance a budget deficit;   but it can be used for liquidity management.  As 
secondary market trades-unless they involve the issuer as a counterparty-have no direct impact on the 
cost of debt nor on its maturity, the authorities could simply leave development of the secondary market 
to the participants in that market.   But restricting the government’s activities to primary issuance of 
debt, and leaving development of secondary trading to the private sector and ‘market forces’, may be 
suboptimal in terms of what are normally the main goals of issuance.  In the case of government 
securities, this is normally:   minimising over the long term the cost of meeting the government's 
financing needs.  In the case of central bank securities, it is likely to be:   supporting liquidity 
management.  Some central banks and Ministries of Finance find that dominance of the financial sector 
by a small number (perhaps 2-3) of banks means that there is insufficient competition, and consequently 
market forces on their own are too weak to provide the incentives needed for strong market 
development. 
 
In addition, there may be a wider interest in ensuring the secondary market for their securities is liquid 
and working efficiently: it is often suggested that this market that acts as the foundation for all the other 
fixed-income securities markets, with its yield curve acting as the benchmark for the pricing of the 
overall credit curve.   And as noted under the definition of ‘money markets’, central banks often use 
government securities when conducting their monetary operations.    
 
The secondary market has both wholesale and retail elements.  While wholesale participants are the 
primary counterparties to the government in its role as issuer, the retail sector is also important since it 
increases demand (reducing cost), and may also perform a social function (making credit-risk free 
savings instruments available to the public).  But for the central bank, interested in secured transactions 
with the commercial banks, liquidity management, the availability of collateral and the informational 
content of the yield curve, it is the wholesale market which is of prime interest.  Indeed it is often the 
case that only banks, and perhaps non-bank financial institutions, are allowed to buy and hold central 
bank bills-reflecting the different reasons for issuing them.  This paper therefore concentrates on the 




                                                                      
Liquidity 
 
The concept of liquidity can be broken down into different factors
1:   tightness, depth and resiliency. 
 
•  Tightness:   the cost of turning around a position over a short time period.  An indicator of 
tightness would be the bid-offer spread in the market.  Typically, the spread in terms of price, 
and possibly also in terms of yield, will be narrower at the short end of the yield curve (except 
perhaps overnight spreads if there are liquidity management problems) or for assets which are 
more in demand.  In the foreign exchange market, for instance, it is often the case that the bid-
offer spread for domestic currency against the US dollar (USD) is very much finer than for other 
currencies, reflecting the common use of and familiarity with the USD compared with other 
foreign currencies (the euro runs a close second in some markets), and the relative ease of 
hedging positions.  In securities markets, benchmark (‘on the run’) securities may trade with a 
finer spread than other issues with a similar maturity. 
 
•  Depth:   the size of trade required to change prices by a given amount.  A tight bid-offer spread 
is only useful to participants if they can conduct transactions at the prices indicated.  If they are 
only valid for small values, then the market is less liquid.  In many markets, very small (retail) 
trades will face a wider spread than small wholesale transactions, but the spread will widen 
again as volumes increase (economies of scale may then be more than offset by the additional 
risk of taking on a large position). 
 
•  Resilience:   the speed with which prices recover from a random, uninformative shock.  All 
markets are likely to react to shocks:   even fundamentally irrelevant news may increase 
uncertainty and so move prices until the market realises it is not relevant (or even mistaken).  In 
a deep market, prices will move back quickly to the previous equilibrium, but in a thin market 
the return may be slow, or the market may even settle at a new level. 
 
These definitions can be applied to money markets, foreign exchange markets and securities markets.  
More prosaically, one might ask:   how easy is it for a bank (and particularly a non state-sector bank) to 
borrow on the interbank market when it has a need, and at what price? Or, is it easy to buy or sell 
foreign exchange or a government security at the indicative market price? 
 
It may also be useful to distinguish, in the securities market, between the liquidity (i) of a security, (ii) 
of a position (this takes size into account), and (iii) of a market.  A market might be generally described 
as liquid, but individual securities in that market may be very liquid, or illiquid.  Again, a dominant 
participant in a market, with a large position (whether long or short) might find it hard to close its 
position quickly without moving prices substantially (so that its position may be said to be illiquid), 
while other, smaller participants experience little difficulty in trading their positions.  A larger number 
of participants of similar size should, other things being equal, boost liquidity
2. 
 
In the securities market, if supply to the market is lower than the demand generated by the investment 
and regulatory needs
3, the securities may be ‘tightly held’ ie not traded frequently.  The market would 
 
1 Suggested in Kyle (1985, Econometrica 53). 
2 ‘More participants increase the probability of a double-coincidence-of-needs trade and reduce the probability of requiring 
the costly warehousing services of a market-maker.’(New Zealand Debt Management Office).  
3 Regulatory needs would include supervisory requirements on banks and investment companies to hold a certain 
proportion of their assets in credit-risk free, liquid securities;  or allowing holdings of central banks or government securities 
to count towards reserve requirements;  or simply a captive market, where banks have to keep a certain percentage of assets 




                                                                      
be relatively illiquid.  But would a larger government financing requirement provided it is covered by 
the sale of tradable securities tend to increase market liquidity? It may not:   increased net expenditure 
by the government may generate additional demand for savings instruments (eg if the government 
consumes more resources, there are fewer for the rest of the economy to consume, so demand for 
savings should increase).  Even if it did boost market liquidity, this would not justify running a larger 
deficit, since the benefits of a more liquid market would be more than offset by higher overall costs.  
For a debt manager, liquidity is useful to the extent it reduces the long-term cost of issuance;   it has no 
benefit per se.  But some governments have aimed to maintain a minimum level of gross issuance, 
building up assets if necessary rather than reducing the level of outstanding securities below the target 
level.  In some cases, this is because they expect to need the market in future years, or believe there are 
wider benefits to the economy from the existence of at least a small government securities market.   
Moreover, the primary issuance programme for government securities may focus on building up 
volumes in benchmark maturities
4 rather than issuing all along the yield curve.    
 
There may be an element of a virtuous circle:   if market participants are more willing to transact and 
take positions in a market where they expect liquidity to continue at a high level, this willingness will 
itself contribute to greater liquidity:   ‘liquidity breeds liquidity’.  Increased liquidity should reduce both 
price volatility and the bid-offer spread.  By reducing the barriers to entry, greater participation can be 
expected.  But these elements of liquidity cannot be forced on a market if interest rates are volatile for 
other reasons-such as unpredictable (or predictable but bad) behaviour by the government, or volatility 
in the exchange rate or inflation;   or if supply is insufficient. 
 
The central bank as price maker?   
 
The central bank will have a different role in price formation in each market.  Broadly, one would 
expect: 
 
•  Money markets:   the central bank is often a price maker at the very short end of the yield curve, 
for monetary policy purposes;   but would not normally be a price maker at maturities much 
beyond fourteen days or in any case beyond the date of the next monetary policy committee 
meeting due to review official rates. Beyond this point, market rates should reflect market 
expectations about future official rates; 
 
•  Foreign exchange markets:   the central bank may be a price maker, or strongly influence prices, 
if an exchange rate target forms part of its monetary policy.  In small markets where the central 
bank is a dominant player, it may seek to stabilise prices even if it does not want to guide the 
rate.  In other countries, the central bank will be purely a price taker; and 
 
•  Securities markets:   the central bank should be a price taker only.  If issuing its own securities 
with a maturity over 14 days, these are issued for liquidity management rather than monetary 
policy implementation.  It may, if it is acting as agent for the Ministry of Finance, play some 
role in smoothing excessive volatility (though this is hard to define) in secondary market prices 
but needs to ensure this does not interfere with its monetary policy function. 
 
4 Two-three, five and ten-year maturities are regarded as the global standards for benchmark securities. But in many 




                                                                      
 
2.  Developing money markets 
Monetary policy transmission and market dominance 
 
Money markets play an important role in the effective implementation of monetary policy via indirect 
instruments.  The relationship is normally mutually reinforcing:   it is hard for money markets to 
develop if design or implementation of monetary policy and operations are suboptimal;   but the central 
bank’s policy operations will become more effective as the money markets develop.  The more 
competitive and liquid the market, the more effective the transmission of monetary policy is likely to 
be
5.   
 
When using indirect instruments, the central bank is dealing with the market as a whole, not with each 
individual institution.  If it withdraws or injects liquidity to/from the market overall, or changes the rate 
at which it operates, it expects market forces-via the interbank, foreign exchange and securities markets 
at first, then via commercial bank transactions with their customers-to pass on, or ‘transmit’, the effect 
of the central bank’s actions.  If it reduces the rates on its open market operations (OMO) and standing 
facilities (SF), then interbank rates for all banks should be reduced, and so on.  But if there is 
insufficient competition-often because the market is dominated by one or a small number of state-
owned banks which are not fully subject to commercial incentives-then the dominant banks may not 
pass on in full the interest rate change, or may even move the level of rates independent of central bank 
policy decisions, while customers may not be able to choose to move their business.  Market dominance 
militates against the development of a liquid interbank market, and against effective transmission of 
monetary policy via interest rate channels.  The impact of the central bank’s policy action will then tend 
to be weaker and more uncertain than would otherwise be the case. 
 
There may also be problems if the government is the only or the dominant borrower in the market and 
there is excess liquidity in the market
6.  In this case, if the central bank tries to increase rates, it will be 
the central bank (through its liquidity draining operations) or the government (through debt issuance) 
which pays.  But this is unlikely to affect the latter’s expenditure behaviour, and the government may 
even put pressure on the central bank to limit increases.   
 
Moreover, if they already hold excess liquidity, the commercial banks may not need to increase deposit 
rates fully in line with the change in official rates in order to attract sufficient funds to buy available 
government or central bank securities.  Even in such circumstances, however, there may be some impact 
from a change in central bank interest rates.  Provided there is some deposit taking and some lending to 
the private sector, then rate changes should have some impact on economic behaviour, albeit weaker 
than the central bank might like.   
 
State-owned banks do not always respond to the normal incentives of pricing and profits as they are not 
always commercially motivated.  They may instead respond to the government’s policy requirements:   
 
5 Liquidity helps to stimulate the government securities market as they reduce the liquidity risk of holding bonds eg through 
the provision of a repo market. For example the Bank of England's decision to introduce an open government bond repo 
market in the United Kingdom in 1996 was designed to fulfill a number of objectives:  i) to attract overseas investors back to 
the UK government bond market;  ii) to provide more widely, an attractive alternative instrument for banks and other 
financial institutions to manage their short-term liquidity;  and iii) from 1997, for daily use in the Bank’s OMOs and thereby 
to help foster the development of efficient and competitive sterling money markets.  
6 If weak private sector loan demand reflects weak economic growth, then inflation may not be a major concern and so 
there is little need to push up interest rates. But if the private sector has funds from government expenditure and/or capital 




                                                                      
they are less likely to react to incentives (or the removal of disincentives) to actively manage their 
liquidity.   Or if the system is skewed heavily, such that a small number of banks have excess liquidity 
while a larger number of banks have a shortage, competition will likewise be weak.  This is a fairly 
common position.  If private banks have only been introduced recently, they will tend to be smaller than 
the state-owned banks.  In many countries, where there is no deposit protection scheme, state banks 
benefit from an implicit government guarantee, resulting in a market distortion:   state-owned banks 
attract retail and other deposits at low rates, and lend often at low rates to risky, so-called ‘priority’ 
sectors;   while private banks may struggle to obtain deposits at competitive rates, and lend to the more 
efficient private sector.   
 
In summary, it will be difficult to achieve an effective transmission of monetary policy via indirect 
instruments if the banking sector is dominated by state-owned (or other) banks and there is insufficient 
competition
7.  That is not to say that the central bank should not start implementing policy through 
indirect mechanisms, as it will be better to have some form of market pricing and interbank trading than 
none at all.  But it does point to the need to tackle market dominance.  Privatisation, or, failing that, 
market incentives for state-owned banks
8 (the government must deal with them at arm’s length, 
avoiding micromanagement) are often recommended but can be hard to implement quickly.  Another 
approach is to remove privileges given to state-owned banks-for instance, as regards capital adequacy-
by putting them on the same legal footing as private sector banks, and allow the private sector to grow.  
Morocco provides a good example of this
9.  This may not be possible without allowing foreign banks 
into the market, since the lack of the implied government guarantee supporting state-owned banks may 




At the same time as developing the money market, the central bank must also provide the appropriate 
infrastructure - establishing a supervisory framework and ensuring that appropriate risk-management 
techniques are in place in the newly commercialised banks.  These issues are covered in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
 
The structure of monetary operations 
 
The central bank’s approach to monetary operations - direct or indirect - and the design of these 
operations will have an impact on the development of the financial markets.    
 
At one extreme, using direct (administrative) controls for the implementation of monetary policy-such 
as controls on interest rates or money quantities-will hinder the development of a money market.   Such 
controls, ever more rarely used today, can limit competition which could benefit both borrowers and 
depositors.   They prevent more efficient banks from expanding their deposits and loans by offering 
higher deposit rates and lower lending rates.   And controls typically perpetuate historic market shares, 
and hence limit progress.   Phasing out these direct controls and moving to indirect instruments for the 
implementation of monetary policy encourages banks to manage their liquidity actively.    
 
 
7 See Annex 3 for one measure of market dominance. 
8 But not recapitalisation:  this makes them more expensive to prospective buyers, but does nothing to enhance efficiency or 
reduce their dominance. 
9 See central bank website www.bkam.ma, section on Banking System, Overview comments on the restructuring of the 
Banque Centrale Populaire and the regional banques populaires. 
10 There are of course cases of private sector financial institutions attracting substantial deposits and growing rapidly, but 




The central bank needs to decide on the type of trade-for example reversed transactions (collateralised 
lending;   term deposits or bill issuance;   repo or swaps) or outright transaction-and any underlying 
collateral (such as government, central bank or commercial bank securities) to use in indirect 
operations. Use of a particular instrument will increase market familiarity with it, and may boost a new 
market.  For example, the Bank of England’s decision to introduce UK government bond repos into its 
monetary operations in 1997 provided this fledging market - it had only opened a year previously - with 
a further boost to liquidity.  The Reserve Bank of Australia started to use repo in the early 1990s despite 
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The maturity and the frequency of central bank operations are important.  Most central bank rate-setting 
OMOs are for a maturity of fourteen days or less.   Any longer-term operations-‘rough tuning’-are done 
at market rates, and undertaken less frequently eg monthly.  OMOs are normally only undertaken in one 
direction-injecting or draining liquidity-on any given day.  SFs may be available in both directions (a 
credit SF is essential to avoid the risk of disruption to payment systems;   deposit SFs are becoming 
more common), but are typically available only for overnight transactions.  This ensures that banks that 
require longer-term trades outside the OMO have to use the market.  For instance, if a market 
participant in the sterling or euro markets wants a transaction with a maturity of more than seven days, 
there would be one opportunity a month to transact in liquidity management OMOs, but otherwise 
recourse to the market would be necessary.  However some central banks regularly - once a week or 
more frequently - transact with the market at a range of maturities out to several months, in some cases 
as price maker.  This reduces the scope and the incentive for banks to develop the interbank market, as 
opportunities for dealing with the central bank are frequent, and they are typically easier from an 
administrative point of view than market transactions.  The line between good liquidity management 
and removing market incentives may be fine (but some central banks are clearly on the wrong side). 
 
The definition of eligible reserves can also affect the development of secondary markets.  Where, as in 
most countries, reserve requirements are in force, market-making activities will be stimulated if the 
central bank excludes interbank transactions from the reserve requirement base-those liabilities of a 
bank used to calculate the reserve requirement ratio.   If Bank A borrows 100 from Bank B and lends 
100 to Bank C (taking on a credit risk, but earning a spread), its balance sheet will increase by 100.  A 
consequent increase in reserve requirements would impose a cost on the intermediary (Bank A) which 




                                                                      
should be eligible to count towards meeting the reserve requirement, most countries accept only current 
account balances at the central bank and sometimes (often with a limitation) vault cash.  Inclusion of 
other central bank liabilities eg central bank bills, or other assets such as government securities, tends to 
make the impact of the reserve requirement itself less predictable, harm the effectiveness of the 
monetary operations, and hinder the development of a liquid secondary market in these securities. 
 
The choice of counterparties to a central bank’s monetary operations will also affect the market’s 
development.   A restricted set of counterparties (privileged access to the central bank) may be 
counterbalanced by a requirement for them to distribute liquidity around the financial system through a 
market-making function-such as the Primary Dealer system in the United States.  The balance between 
restricting access to central bank operations (arguably an anti-competitive approach) and the benefit of 
market-making needs to be re-assessed regularly.  Where there are hundreds of potential counterparties, 
there may be an efficiency gain from working with a smaller group of intermediaries.   In this case, the 
group should be open, allowing institutions to join or leave depending on changes in their business.   In 
some  markets, however, the role of primary dealer/market maker merely acts as an obstacle to direct 
transactions between banks, or between commercial banks and the central bank.     
 
Liquidity management by the central bank 
 
When designing its monetary operations framework, the central bank will need to choose between a 
passive or active stance towards liquidity management.   Some central banks adopt a passive approach - 
perhaps due to an inability to forecast accurately the market’s liquidity position - placing a heavy 
reliance on SFs as their prime liquidity management tool;   or simply leave excess liquidity in the 
market.  Others take a more active approach, using OMOs as their main liquidity management tool, with 
standing facilities employed as a liquidity ‘safety valve’ mechanism.   The difference in approaches will 
be reflected, in part, by the width - in terms of basis points - of the interest rate corridor between the 
credit and deposit facilities.   A passive approach is more likely to result in a narrow corridor
11 if it is 
important to the central bank to reduce short-term rate volatility.  This reduces the cost to market 
participants of trading with the central bank (as it is a credit-risk free counterparty), with the result that 
SF transactions constitute a large proportion of total central bank transactions with the market.  A recent 
Reserve Bank of India paper
12 notes:   ‘there is a moral hazard that passive operations by central bank 
in the market may be resulting in some market players not doing enough for their own liquidity 
management’ (the corridor width is 100 basis points).  At the extreme, the central bank could operate 
like a money broker with no spread, taking deposits and lending money at the same rate and at any time, 
but then commercial banks would have no incentive at all to transact with each other since their needs 
could always be met by transacting with the most creditworthy counterparty
13.   In some cases there is a 
wide corridor between SFs and excess liquidity is left in the market.  This tends to be associated with 
poor money market liquidity and volatile short-term rates. 
 
An active approach by contrast would set a corridor wide enough to give market participants an 
incentive to find a trading partner first and foremost in the market place, with the central bank SFs a last 
 
11 What constitutes ‘wide’ or ‘narrow’ will vary from market to market. In some countries, 100 basis points either side 
around the Policy Rate would be quite narrow, and SFs might seem relatively inexpensive to users. In others, a corridor 25 
basis points either side of the Policy Rate might give sufficient incentive to banks to search the market for liquidity before 
turning to the central bank. 
12 ‘Coping with liquidity management in India:  a practitioner’s view’-Rakesh Mohan. 
13 One of the Gulf central banks adopts just such an approach, in order to guarantee its exchange rate peg to the USD. There 
is no domestic market, since dealing with the central bank always achieves the best rate. If a central bank in such 




                                                                      
resort.   But too wide a corridor may lead to excessive volatility in interest rates, which will discourage 
trading:   banks may be so averse to paying a high rate for accessing central bank credit, or attracting the 
stigma that is sometimes associated with its use, that they increase precautionary holdings of liquidity 
rather than trading any surplus in the market.
14  There is, of course, a trade-off between the potential 
rate of return that can be obtained in the market place and the credit risk involved.   
 
The length of the reserve maintenance period is also important.   Under reserve averaging - whether 
reserves are required or on a voluntary contractual basis -  there is a multi-day reserve maintenance 
period, so that banks do not need to meet the set reserve target every day and instead can use a surplus 
of reserve holdings on one day to meet a preceding or forthcoming shortage.  Most countries use a two-
week or one-month period, with the objective of smoothing the profile of short-term interest rates
15.   In 
this system there may be less incentive to manage their liquidity position actively or a daily basis.   
Central banks therefore need to consider whether the benefit of introducing/lengthening a multi-day 
reserve maintenance period on smoothing short-term interest rate volatility may be offset by reduced 
market activity
16.  Experience is mixed on this, and depends not just on the length of the maintenance 
period and the degree of averaging allowed, but also on the degree of certainty that the central bank will 
manage liquidity within the maintenance period appropriately.  For example, if banks cannot rely on the 
central bank to manage overall market liquidity accurately, they will tend to hold larger volumes of 
precautionary liquidity, and may be reluctant to run down balances at the central bank for fear of being 
short (and thus having to pay penal - sometimes very penal - rates for the credit SF).  Averaging will 
reduce the daily constraint, and, provided the maintenance period is at least two weeks long, may 
liberate some banks to take advantage of market opportunities.  The Bank of England has found, since 
the introduction of averaging in May 2006, that the volume of overnight interbank trading has not 
fallen; a similar experience has been seen in other markets (and in some it has in fact increased). But 
averaging in itself is an insufficient condition for market activity.   
 
If there is no averaging, banks will hold a certain level of voluntary reserves. However, if the cost of 
holding these is high - as in the United Kingdom prior to May 2006, when reserve balances were not 
remunerated - banks will tend to hold as low a level as possible. In general, banks will give more weight 
to cost minimisation rather than interest rate stability; central banks tend to give more importance to 
interest rate stability.  
Liquidity forecasting 
 
Successful liquidity management by the central bank requires an understanding of the flows between the 
central bank and the market ie  an analysis of the flows across the central bank’s balance sheet.   Central 
banks need to forecast the autonomous factors affecting reserves - primarily notes in circulation;   net 
foreign assets;   and net lending to the government - and to undertake offsetting transactions with the 
banks so that actual reserve holdings by the commercial banks are close to demanded levels.   Poor 
liquidity management by the central bank can weaken the banking system’s incentive to manage 
liquidity actively.   Fine-tuning operations - for example at the end of the reserve maintenance period - 
can deal with late swings in liquidity conditions
17, but if the poor predictability of autonomous factors 
 
14 In some countries, the credit SF rate has come adrift from market rates, often when a general surplus of liquidity means 
that the credit SF is rarely needed. In such cases, the credit SF rate may be very much higher than short-term market rates. 
15 A one-week averaging period, used by a small number of central banks, is normally too short to encourage active use of 
averaging by commercial banks. 
16 Other issues that need to be considered are the impact on the supply of central bank reserve money (averaging may reduce 
demand) as well as prudential concerns surrounding commercial bank’s liquidity management. 
17 And if the market expects these operations to take place, then they will be effective in limiting excessive volatility in 




subject to large and volatile swings is a source of concern, it is perhaps best for the central bank to 
attempt to tackle the underlying problems.   
 
‘Net lending to the government’ is typically the most volatile and unpredictable component:   good 
government cash management is essential for smooth trading conditions.   In many countries, the central 
bank asks for a forecast of the government’s key revenue and expenditure flows, broken down by 
component, with as high a frequency of data as possible (ideally daily, but at least weekly) and going 
out at least to the end of the current and the next reserve maintenance periods.   The central bank also 
requires advance notice from the government if it is going to deviate from this timetable by a significant 
amount.    
 
Indicative and actual market data 
 
Markets thrive on information.  Providing sufficient information to market participants - whether it is 
about the central bank’s operations (eg  the size and direction of the market’s liquidity position vis-à-vis 
the central bank) or interbank trading-will also help to encourage banks to manage their liquidity 
positions actively.    
  
In developed markets with modern communications systems, there are generally two types of interest 
rate information available:   indicative bid/offer data, which may be available virtually real-time and on 
a continuous basis;   and actual trade data, which is normally only available in aggregate form, with a 
time-lag, and for certain periods eg one day. 
 
The first type, indicative market rates, are normally published by the commercial bankers’ association - 
for instance, Libor (London InterBank Offered Rate) published by the British Bankers’ Association (see 
www.bba.org.uk), or Euribor, published by the European Banking Federation (see www.euribor.org).  A 
panel of banks - normally the largest in the relevant market - supplies indicative rates to the bankers’ 
association at a set time each day, for a given range of maturities eg  overnight, 1 week, 1,2,3…12 
months;   a set amount;    and for a given credit quality
18.  This may be stated as ‘What rate would you 
expect to offer a top-quality borrower borrowing X million for Y days?’, or ‘At what rate would you 
expect to borrow?’.  The association then rejects the outliers eg  the top and bottom 10% of quotes;   
and publishes the average of the remaining rates, normally before noon on the same day.  Since the rates 
are indicative, no volume data can be published.  Indeed, in most markets the central bank does not 
know the volume of overall interbank trading, and does not need to.  Indicative rates based on a clear 
format may be preferable to a weighted average of actual rates provided by the same banks, since the 
rates might then vary because of differences in the credit quality of the borrower, the amount borrowed, 
the time of day, the exact maturity and so on. 
 
In developed markets, where the bid-offer spread for the standard amounts and counterparties are stable 
and well-known, it is sufficient to publish an ‘offered’ rate.  The table below shows sterling Libor 
published by the BBA. 
                                                                       
18 In the case of Euribor, for instance, ‘the rate at which euro interbank term deposits within the euro zone are offered by 






  Aug  2006      
GBP    21-Aug 22-Aug 23-Aug 24-Aug 25-Aug 
       
s/n-o/n  3.08500 3.08313 3.07563 3.04844 3.02594 
1w  3.08988 3.08825 3.08150 3.06138 3.04413 
2w  3.09688 3.09813 3.08938 3.07313 3.06813 
1m  3.10763 3.10825 3.10825 3.10050 3.09875 
2m  3.15763 3.16263 3.16125 3.16938 3.17088 
3m  3.24488 3.24863 3.25413 3.25613 3.25625 
4m  3.30488 3.30588 3.30875 3.31650 3.31625 
5m  3.37500 3.37900 3.38138 3.39013 3.38325 
6m  3.43625 3.43575 3.43613 3.44600 3.43725 
7m  3.48563 3.48550 3.47125 3.48338 3.47000 
8m  3.52788 3.52550 3.50625 3.52813 3.51000 
9m  3.56875 3.56463 3.53675 3.55813 3.54288 
10m  3.60700 3.59500 3.56313 3.58488 3.56638 
11m  3.63638 3.62750 3.58825 3.61400 3.58875 
12m  3.66088 3.65338 3.60975 3.63475 3.60875 
 
In newer markets, there may be a case for giving an indication of the standard spread, or publishing both 
bid and offer rates if the spread is volatile. 
 
Box:   The role of the broker  
 
A broker’s function in the wholesale financial markets is to act as an intermediary or agent, bringing 
together two independent counterparties to a transaction in a cost effective way.   
A broker does not take principal positions and does not, therefore, take onto his own books the financial 
risks of the transaction he brokers.  He acts as a conduit for price data and market news.  By offering 
current, as well as historical, market information, he helps the client accurately price a wide range of 
products, whilst receiving a brokerage fee for his service. 
Most importantly, the broker provides the market with liquidity.  Business is transacted by telephone or 
screen giving access to a network of hundreds of potential wholesale counterparties worldwide.  It 
should be noted that neither the general public nor the retail investor has direct access to the wholesale 
broker market.   
A key responsibility of the broker is to provide speedy execution.  This requires negotiating skills and 
acute awareness of market practice.  By giving the client a neutral and rapid service, confidentiality of 
sensitive price and counterparty information is assured.   
Source:   the Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association (www.wmba.org.uk). 
 
 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York publishes actual trade data in the form of the daily effective 




                                                                      
brokers) as well as the range.  Equivalent rates are available for sterling (known as SONIA
19) and the 
euro (EONIA
20).  Because it is based on actual data, it cannot be published before close of business;  
and it will not capture all overnight loans in the market, only those involving one of the reporting banks. 
 The Bank of England, the ECB and the US Federal Reserve Bank also provide information on their 
monetary operations, including the amount bid and accepted, and, where appropriate, the stop-out rate, 
weighted-average rate and highest and lowest rates bid. 
 
Banks and brokers can use wire services (where these exist) to publish indicative rates continuously in 
real time.  Actual rates, of course, will be subject to bilateral negotiation.  In markets where 
communications are not easy, rates may need to be communicated by radio or in the press the following 
day.   However it is done, there is a clear benefit to the market from dissemination of price information 
on a standardised basis. 
Underlying need to trade and surplus liquidity 
 
This chapter has discussed incentives for banks and other financial institutions to trade with each other 
and develop a market yield curve eg  through privatisation of state owned banks, the design of a central 
bank's monetary operations and by improvements to price transparency.   But what about the underlying 
need to trade? Banks will typically trade central bank funds when the banking system as a whole has 
sufficient central bank balances (though not too much), since individual banks will from time to time 
face a temporary shortage or a surplus.   But if there is a persistent and large surplus or shortage of 
central bank money in the economy, banks will tend to be in the same position as each other and 
therefore have little chance of finding another bank with a matching (opposite) position to trade with.    
 
In markets where there is an underlying shortage of liquidity-the UK, the US, the euro zone, for 
instance-central banks almost always provide broadly sufficient liquidity through OMO to meet the 
market’s needs.  An accurate liquidity forecast means that they do not oversupply the market-otherwise 
immediately after the OMO there would be excess liquidity, and short-term rates might fall to the 
deposit SF rate (or zero, if there is none)
21.  But where there is an underlying surplus of liquidity-as is 
the case in most countries around the world
22 - it is commonplace for central banks not to drain all of 
the surplus.  In part this reflects difficulties in forecasting liquidity accurately;  but in many cases it 
reflects a reluctance to pay the cost of draining the excess.  If all banks are long of liquidity, no one will 
borrow and there is no scope for an interbank market to develop.  The Bank of Japan recognises the 
impact of excess liquidity on markets:   ‘[The current structure of monetary operations, or QEP 
(Quantitative Easing Programme)] itself has led to sluggish trading and thus the weakening of the 
intermediation function in the money market (Chart 12).  Under QEP, lenders’ incentive for transactions 
has declined because the call rate has remained very close to zero, making it difficult to cover 
transaction costs with interest margins.  From the perspective of borrowers, the need to raise funds in 
the money market has declined mainly because the funds-supplying operations of the Bank have offered 
the primary means of financing.’ 
 
 
19 SONIA-Sterling OverNight Interbank Average-is the weighted average rate to four decimal places of all unsecured 
sterling overnight cash transactions brokered in London by WMBA (Wholesale Market Brokers’ Association) member firms 
between midnight and 4.15 pm with all counterparties in a minimum deal size of £25 million. 
20 EONIA-Euro OverNight Index Average-is the weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions 
undertaken in the interbank market, initiated within the euro area by the contributing banks. 
21 Averaging should offset the impact of a short-term liquidity surplus, except towards the end of a maintenance period. 
22 The causes of excess liquidity vary, but are predominantly:  a build-up of foreign exchange reserves, perhaps to prevent 




[Chart 12]  Japan: CABs and the uncollateralised call market





















































[CABs are Current Account Balances held by commercial banks at the Bank of Japan.] 
 
Draining excess liquidity may be expensive where the central bank is a net borrower from the market, 
but is a necessary precursor to the development of the short-term yield curve and trading of interbank 
funds
23.   
 
Even if there is an underlying need, interbank trading may not happen.  In some cases, there will be 
strong segmentation in the banking sector, such that one group of banks might make occasional trades 
with others in the group eg  state-owned and foreign banks, while the remaining banks might trade 
occasionally with each other.  In many countries, this sort of segmentation is a factor of perceived credit 
risk (Section 5.i elaborates on credit risk);  and in some cases a reluctance by state-owned banks to deal 
with small private domestic commercial banks.   A surplus in one sector will thus not necessarily flow 
to cover a deficit in the other.   
 
The authorities should not aim to try to generate demand artificially, or force banks to trade.  Suppose 
for instance that there is a generalised surplus of liquidity, so that all banks want to deposit and none 
wants to borrow.  The central bank could increase reserve requirements to the point where the banks 
were short of liquidity.  But this might lead to re-characterisation of the banks’ balance sheets over time, 
or to a shift in financial transactions outside the banking sector.   Instead the authorities should seek to 
understand what is the underlying reason for the lack of trading and assess whether the obstacle reflects 
inefficient behaviour (including on the part of the central bank or Ministry of Finance) that can be 
modified.  For example, there may be excess liquidity because of fiscal dominance (monetary financing 
                                                                       




of the government);  or it may be that there are current or capital inflows, but that capital controls 
prevent residents from investing abroad.  In both these cases, the surplus is a reflection of behaviour by 
the authorities which can be changed.   Alternatively the central bank might sell long-term securities (at 
a market rate) to drain the structural surplus.  Banks could then invest spare funds in high quality 
interest-earning assets, and use the money market to help manage shorter-term liquidity.  Banks will, or 
at least should, operate with a profit motive.  If it is both possible and profitable to structure their 
balance sheets in such a way that they will have periodic need to use the interbank market, they will do 




                                                                      
3.  Developing the foreign exchange market 
Policy background 
 
Foreign exchange markets exist in virtually all economies, at least on a cash basis;  the challenge for 
central banks is to move the wholesale market efficiently onto a non-cash basis.  A key question for 
some is:   Should a measure of de facto dollarisation
24 of the economy be accepted? If the answer is Yes, 
then the central bank may want to build a non-cash payment system that supports the foreign currency, 
and may run foreign exchange accounts for its commercial banks.  This will allow them to settle with 
each other across the central bank’s books in foreign exchange;  and may make it easier for small banks, 
which cannot easily arrange correspondent accounts with foreign banks, to manage their positions 
efficiently.  But if the central bank wishes to encourage de-dollarisation, and believes it can do so 
without harm to the economy, it may not want to facilitate the use of non-domestic currencies.  There 
may be a conflict between short-term support for market efficiency, and a longer-term goal of 
promoting use of the domestic currency. 
 
There is an argument that de-dollarisation can improve the efficacy of monetary policy-both because 
more use of the domestic  currency increases the impact of monetary policy changes;  and because a 
high  level of dollarisation is often associated with a de facto exchange rate target.  The latter in turn 
tends to be associated with a constrained use of interest rate levers, since either the yield curve will tend 
to follow that of the target currency, if markets are operating effectively;  or the levers will be weak 
because interest rate markets are not functioning well.  ‘De-dollarisation typically occurs as an 
endogenous phenomenon, along with a marked reduction in the rate of inflation, and not as a result of 
direct and active policies with that objective.  Yet…policymakers can also have a direct role in this 
process by contributing to the development and deepening of domestic financial markets.
25’ And one 
would certainly expect that improved monetary policy and/or monetary policy implementation would 
encourage de-dollarisation. 
 
The level of dollarisation may influence the denomination of reserve requirements:   if all reserve 
requirements have to be held in domestic currency, commercial banks will have more of an incentive to 
take domestic currency rather than foreign currency deposits, since this will reduce their open foreign 
exchange position.  But a small interest rate incentive might not be sufficient to change the behavior of 
depositors.  If they are risk averse and are concerned about exchange rate risk - ie the risk of a sharp 
depreciation of the domestic currency - or if they want to hedge foreign-exchange denominated 
liabilities, they may still prefer to make deposits in foreign currency.  Private-sector foreign-currency 
deposits dominate the commercial banks’ deposit base in many economies, and can be over 90% of the 
commercial banks’ balance sheets.   
 
The existence of excess domestic currency liquidity can induce banks to hold foreign currency deposits. 
Commercial banks can nearly always invest foreign currency abroad, for a return, and so have some 
incentive to attract foreign currency deposits;  but if there is excess domestic currency liquidity, they 
may earn no marginal return on domestic currency deposits, so there is little incentive to attract deposits 
in domestic currency. 
 
 
24 Dollarisation is taken to mean the substantial use of a non-domestic currency for transactional purposes as well as a store 
of value. It need not involve the use of US dollars:  euros and other currencies are used in some countries, for instance. 
25 ‘Inflation targeting in dollarised economies’, Central Bank of Chile Working Papers no. 368, July 2006 (Leiderman, 




Cash handling can present some tricky issues.  If there is a substantial level of dollarisation, the central 
bank’s counterparties may at times wish to withdraw or pay in large amounts of foreign currency cash.  
Central banks do not normally charge for handling domestic currency;  but should a charge be levied for 
handling foreign currency? There are real costs involved:   cash handlers, transport, storage, risk of 
forgery, as well as the high labour costs involved if millions of dollars have to be counted out by hand 
and verified (machines can be used to count notes as long as their physical condition is reasonable).  At 
a transition point, an excessive charge for cash handling-which may be seen as a charge for converting 
cash into electronic balances-may simply discourage a shift from cash to book-entry trading in foreign 
exchange.  In the medium term, it should be more efficient, and therefore cheaper for all involved, to 
move wholesale amounts of foreign currency in book-entry form;  but in the transition period the 
incentive structure may need to be slightly different from the expected longer-term version, in order to 
encourage a shift from cash to book-entry. 
 
The exchange rate policy of the central bank is also an important factor.  At one extreme, if there is a 
hard exchange rate peg, then the central bank has to stand ready to buy or sell foreign exchange at the 
target price at any time.  This gives the domestic banks little incentive to develop wholesale non-cash 
based trading, since they can always trade with the central bank at the official price.  There may be a 
form of market, if foreign banks or domestic companies - who cannot access the central bank - wish to 
engage in foreign exchange transactions.  The central bank could give the market some incentive, by 
charging a commission for foreign exchange trades, as long as this was not so large as to give scope for 
market trading away from the official rate.  The existence of an exchange rate peg should set pricing for 
the retail market;  the central bank (or other body, if the central bank does not regulate the foreign 
exchange market) may want at least to ensure that spreads are clearly displayed so that users of the 
market know what the real costs are. 
 
Where there is a managed float, the central bank will still need to intervene in the market in response to 
market demand, and so will need the capacity to follow the market and participate where necessary.  
(Even where there is a free float, the central bank will normally want to retain the capacity to act, for 
precautionary reasons.) If the central bank is participating regularly in the market in order to guide, or 
simply stabilise, prices, then there is a benefit to doing so in a transparent way.  The signaling impact of 
the operations may have the most rapid impact on the market.  This points to using an OMO-type 
structure for its market interventions.  Perhaps the most difficult question facing a central bank in this 
case is:   Is it possible to participate in the market without dominating it? Even if the answer is No, there 
remains some scope for market development since-unlike the case of the exchange rate peg-the central 
bank does not need to participate continuously in the market.  It may run an auction once a day, or twice 
a week;  but at other times, banks will need to trade in the market to manage their positions and 
liquidity.  Moreover, some central banks allow commercial banks to bid in either direction in their 




Some of the discussion in the next section on developing secondary markets for securities has a read-
across to foreign exchange markets.  But there are sufficient differences to warrant separate treatment.   
 
As noted above, retail, and some elements of wholesale, markets in foreign exchange will tend to exist 
in a country without any need for encouragement from the authorities-and in some cases, despite 
attempts by the authorities to discourage it.  If exchange controls are in place, or the central bank is 
trying to impose an official exchange rate which is out of line with the market, then it is not uncommon 




                                                                      
even push at least part of the market underground, and deprive the central bank of potentially useful 
information.
26 Moreover, an underground market will almost certainly be cash-based:   this is likely to 
be less efficient for the economy as a whole, and will have no audit trail. 
 
If the central bank operates a genuinely floating exchange rate regime, and does not use foreign 
exchange transactions as a monetary instrument, it could leave the foreign exchange market purely to 
the private sector.  And in developed markets, where the central bank’s foreign exchange operations 
will tend to be only a small fraction of overall market transactions, it would be usual for the central bank 
simply to make use of existing private sector systems and practices.  This might include multilateral 
systems eg Reuters Dealing
27, or EBS
28;  or telephone and other wire services for bilateral 
communication and trading. 
 
If the central bank wants to play a more significant role in the foreign exchange market-notably if it has 
an exchange rate target, or a managed float-it will need an efficient means for doing so.  In theory, it 
could simply participate in the cash market;  indeed, some central banks have done just this, at an early 
stage of market development.  But there are a range of reasons for moving away from cash dealing: 
 
•  Handling large volumes of cash is expensive and time-consuming; 
•  it may be harder to involve counterparties outside the capital city; 
•  the audit trail is weaker; 
•  if the central bank’s transactions are bilateral, they are much less transparent; and 
•  there are additional costs to investing or using the proceeds
29. 
 
It is normally possible to move quite quickly from cash-based central bank foreign exchange 
transactions to book-entry transactions, without disrupting the market.  Afghanistan and Iraq provide 
good examples of such a move, although cash remains important in the commercial banks’ transactions 
with their customers.  If the foreign exchange market is managed largely by bureau de change/money 
changers rather than by banks, then a move to book-entry transactions with the central bank must 
involve either the intermediation of the banks (this will need planning to ensure it does not damage the 
existing market by adding excessive costs), or, perhaps for an interim period, allowing money dealers to 
operate accounts at the central bank (until the banks can intermediate efficiently, or the money dealers 
can take on banking functions and maybe apply to become licensed banks).   
 
In many developing countries, the central bank re-channels foreign exchange from the government to 
the rest of the economy (or occasionally vice versa).  It may be that the government earns foreign 
exchange from commodity exports, or it receives donor funds or loans in foreign exchange;  and sells 
the foreign exchange to the central bank in order to obtain domestic currency for local expenditures.  
Central banks normally re-channel a part of this foreign exchange to the economy, selling it bilaterally 
(especially if there is a pegged exchange rate) or in foreign exchange auctions. 
 
If there is a pegged or tightly managed exchange rate, then clearly the market cannot in the short-term 
determine the exchange rate; it may be able to influence it in the longer-term if there is an inconsistency 
 
26 One central bank, for instance, acted as if the flourishing street market did not exist, and would not collect data from a 
(strictly-speaking) illegal market. This meant simply that it did not know how close the official rate was to the real, street 
rate. 
27 See http://about.reuters.com/productinfo/financial/ - under ‘Treasury’. 
28 See www.ebs.com;  EBS (Electronic Broker System) is a foreign exchange trading platform, owned by ICAP 
(www.icap.com), which also owns BrokerTec, a securities trading platform. 
29 USD 100 million in cash will cost money to hold securely;  USD100 million in a bank account should earn the owner a 




between the exchange rate policy and other elements of central bank policy (eg low domestic inflation, 
or maintenance of a certain level of foreign exchange reserves).   But while the market may not have a 
price-formation role, it can provide a useful function in distributing foreign exchange to the economy at 
the wholesale market rate (the rate guided by the central bank).  Market forces should have an impact on 
the size of commissions and spreads, and the quality of services provided.   
 
If the exchange rate regime is floating, or is a managed float, then the central bank will want to allow 
[some] scope for the market to influence the settlement price in its transactions with the central bank.  A 
bid-price auction, but where the central bank can vary the amount sold depending on the combination of 
size and price of bids made, can achieve this.  In some countries, the central bank allows participants to 
bid in either direction.  This can be helpful in allowing the auction process to support a two-way market. 
 
It is not clear whether a single-price or multiple-price auction is best for market development:   there are 




                                                                      
 
4.  Developing securities markets 
 
The central bank as issuer 
 
The rationale for issuing central bank securities is not the same as for government securities, and there 
may be different priorities or expectations from the secondary market.  A central bank will normally 
only issue its own domestic currency securities if there is a surplus of liquidity in the market and it has 
no other assets which can easily be sold.  Revenue maximisation is not a goal.  It may issue short-term 
bills as a price maker, in order to implement a Policy Rate and fine-tune liquidity management;  and/or 
issue longer-term bills, or even bonds (ie with an initial maturity of over twelve months) as price taker, 
for liquidity management purposes.   
 
The goal of liquidity management will in part be met by issuing the correct volume of securities, in 
order to drain the surplus.   If the central bank has a clear idea about the appropriate level of short-term 
interest rates, and wants to ensure wide access to its Policy Rate operations, it may opt for fixed-price 
issuance for short-term bills.  For these short-term bills, being able to use them as collateral or in repo 
transactions - whether with the central banks or with other market participants - may suffice for them to 
be viewed as ‘liquid’;  demand for outright trading will probably be low in view of their short 
maturities.   
 
But if the central bank is issuing longer-term securities - whether 1 month or 20 years - in order to put 
part of its liquidity management on a longer-term footing, then the wider goal of supporting efficient 
liquidity management by the market indicates that secondary market liquidity of these longer-term 
securities should be valuable to the central bank.  In some countries, the central bank makes longer-term 
securities available to the market, but auctions are on occasion undersubscribed despite the existence of 
excess liquidity in the market.  This tends to be because liquidity conditions are volatile and the central 
bank’s credit Standing Facility is viewed as too expensive, so that banks choose to bear the cost of 
holding large amounts of precautionary liquidity rather than taking the risk of being locked into long-
term maturities and having to pay a high price to obtain short-term liquidity. 
 
The government as issuer 
 
The secondary market in government securities performs a number of important functions which are of 
benefit to the authorities.  By providing for more frequent trading than the primary market - in principle 
it can be continuous
30, rather than involving set-piece sales such as a primary market auction - it 
facilitates both price formation and market access, and should support market demand not only in the 
secondary, but also in the primary market.  The existence of secondary market prices allows market 
participants to make a judgement about the appropriate price for a security when bidding in a primary 
market auction.   (In a market economy this is the market clearing price, or the price at which demand to 
hold the securities meets the existing - and expected future - level of supply, rather than a price which 
the government might deem to be reasonable.)   
 
If participants are uncertain about the appropriate level - for instance if there is no secondary market;  or 
if prices in the secondary market are not visible - they will tend to pay a lower price than would 
otherwise be the case.  Moreover, if participants are uncertain of being able to invest in securities when 
 




                                                                      
they have free cash, or to sell securities at a reasonable price when they need cash (if the typical bid-
offer spread is too wide), they will tend to pay a lower price for the securities to compensate for this 
uncertainty.  And primary market prices will be influenced by secondary market prices, so that lower 
secondary market prices mean lower prices (ie  a higher yield cost) for the government as issuer.  Put 
another way, the wider the bid-offer spread, the less money the government, as a price taker, will 
receive when selling securities into the market.   As such, as secondary markets in government 
securities develop (ie  become more liquid demonstrated by a tighter bid-offer spread as demand for the 
securities increases), this will have the effect in the long run of lowering the government’s financing 
costs. 
 
Increasing the number of participants in the market should also benefit the government as issuer by 
boosting competition.  If there are only a few traders in the securities market, they may not need to 
compete with each other and so may be able to make excess profits.   But if there is sufficient 
competition then the core traders should make only reasonable profits, with a diversified investor base 
also happier to deal in such markets.    
 
Secondary market trading also provides a mechanism for the securities to move from the primary 
market - which is often based around commercial banks - to end investors such as insurance companies, 
pension funds and retail investors. 
 
Development of a well-functioning secondary market in government securities may also act as a primer 
for the development of all other fixed income securities markets.   As a market (virtually) free from 
credit risk
31, its yield curve becomes the benchmark for pricing other financial assets, thereby helping to 
establish an overall credit curve.   Some argue that there is no need for government securities to be 
issued:   the market should be able to price private sector securities on the basis of its expectations for 
inflation, real interest rates and risk.  On the other hand, the ‘market’ can only form a view by 
interaction in transactions;  and in most markets, there is insufficient secondary market trading of 
private sector securities to provide a good yield curve.  In a few countries, the government has issued 
securities in order to support yield-curve development (such as the Exchange Fund Bills and Notes in 
Hong Kong), even if there is no financing need.  The issuance volume required for this purpose will 
depend on the market, and the extent of the yield curve:    perhaps 10% of GDP might suffice, on the 
basis of the Hong Kong example.  This approach is easier to take if the cost of domestic issuance is not 
too high and the exchange rate reasonably stable (since the government will typically invest the 
proceeds abroad);  indeed, some issuers who take this line make a profit from issuance, as they can 
borrow relatively cheaply in the domestic market, and invest profitably in the international markets. 
 
In some developing economies, Finance Ministries and central banks will, understandably, have little 
experience of secondary markets for government securities, and may find the task of developing such 
markets to be daunting.  But many of the principles involved will be familiar in the contexts of existing 
markets for physical goods and centre on the basic economic principles of demand and supply.  What 
are the key features? 
 
 
31 Some governments do occasionally default on their domestic debt. One banker in a former Soviet Union country asked 
who would guarantee government securities, were the government to issue them? Interestingly, the central bank was seen as 
an appropriate guarantor. In another FSU country, the central bank removed government securities from the list of assets 





Tradable goods for which demand exists 
 
There are a number of reasons for the market to demand government securities.  First, if the government 
is running a budget deficit without borrowing from the market, then the monetary base will expand.  If 
demand for physical cash does not grow in tandem, then bankers’ balances with the central bank will 
increase (unless they can use excess balances to buy foreign exchange from the central bank);  and these 
will typically be non-interest bearing.  Other things being equal, banks will prefer to hold interest 
bearing securities rather than non-interest bearing balances.  Second, and especially in a developing 
market, the government can offer credit-risk free assets to investors.  If uncertainty or perceived credit 
risk in the economy generally are high, there will be a premium on risk-free assets.  The fact that many 
central banks accept government securities as collateral in their monetary operations, and that they can 
usually be counted towards regulatory liquidity requirements also provide incentives for market 
participants to hold them.  In a number of markets, government and central bank securities are the only 
tradable investment in the country.  Equity issuance may be small, and turnover low;  and corporate 
issuance of securities is in many cases non-existent.  While in principle market participants could invest 
excess funds abroad, there are benefits to the economy and the financial system (including the central 
bank) in particular in having available a domestic-currency denominated, domestically settled, tradable 
asset with some form of return.  (If no return were required, cash would suffice to meet the need for a 
risk-free transferable asset.) 
 
There is clearly a demand for tradable government (or central bank) securities in transitional 
economies; but demand for certain types of security will be greater than for others.  It would be possible 
to design a security for which virtually no demand would exist.   For instance, a ten year zero coupon 
domestic currency bond issued in an economy where inflation was high would be worth very little, 
would be of very uncertain value, and would probably not be worth trading.   But by the same token, if 
it is possible to design bonds for which demand is negligible, it should also be possible to design bonds 
for which demand would be strong.  It is possible that securities will notionally be tradable, but not in 
practice.  For instance, if securities are forced onto a captive market at an above-market cost, the 
purchasers may be reluctant to sell the securities at a book-loss.  However, not all debt issued by a 
government need be tradable.   In a number of market economies, non-tradable government debt, sold 
primarily to the retail sector, accounts for a significant proportion of the government's borrowing 
requirement;  but no secondary market can exist.    
 
As suggested earlier, any securities issued by a central bank for longer-term liquidity management 
should be tradable.  If they were not tradable, they would be no different to a deposit.  And given the 
limited number of potential holders (since they would not be aimed at the retail market), many of which 
may have an account with the central bank, the administrative costs of making the securities tradable 
should be negligible. 
 
Reasonable denomination of goods 
 
The minimum size of trades will affect, or should perhaps be determined by, the market.   An issuer, or 
an exchange might set a high minimum size for transactions in order to discourage retail participation;  
but individual dealers should be free to transact in whatever denominations are most suitable.   Some 
traders may want to focus solely on the wholesale market (primary dealers in most market economies do 




                                                                      
market might be in multiples of a certain minimum value (eg £1 million for most UK government 
securities).    
 
If the minimum trading value is too low - perhaps fixed by regulations - banks, dealers or an exchange 
may become cluttered with a large volume of small, possibly loss-making, deals and this could have a 
negative overall effect on price formation and market efficiency.  The needs of the wholesale and retail 
markets are likely to differ, pointing to the need for distinct but complementary markets (as is in fact the 
case in many markets for physical goods).  A low minimum denomination at issuance (eg £0.01 in the 
United Kingdom), combined with freedom for market participants to set different a minimum size (or 
sizes) for their own transactions, can support this. 
Regularity and sufficiency of supply   
 
Different types of good will require/benefit from different types of market.   A fruit and vegetable 
market ideally needs to be open every day, and to have sufficient supply to meet daily demand without 
price fluctuations (at a certain price, demand and supply will of course always be in balance).   If I want 
fruit today but the market is not open until five day’s time, I may do without or buy a cake rather than 
wait:   the bakery benefits at the expense of the fruit and vegetable market due to the latter having 
irregular supply.   Or if I want to invest in a Treasury security now but the market is not open for several 
days, I may place my cash in the interbank market, or in equities, instead.    
 
Additionally, if supply at the fruit market is uneven so that on one occasion I must queue and pay a high 
price, but on another find prices to be low, a dislike of queuing, for instance, may put me off the market. 
If secondary market supply of treasury securities is very variable - perhaps reflecting variable primary 
market issuance - so that at one time there is a shortage of securities, and a few days later the opposite, 
then prices will tend to fluctuate and the depth of the market will also be variable.   This type of 
uncertainty tends to discourage participation in the market, so that in the medium to long term, stable 
(non-speculative) demand is reduced, so lowering prices.  More predictability facilitates participation 
(reduces the barriers to entry);  and in general more participants should lead to greater competition and a 
more efficient market.   Moreover, if supply is not sufficient to meet underlying demand
32, those who 
purchase securities in the primary market will be very reluctant to sell them, as they will be unsure of 
being able to buy securities later on to replace them.   If these holders will not trade their securities, a 
secondary market cannot develop because of a simple lack of goods (securities) to trade.   
 
The debt manager can help to achieve these twin aims of regularity and sufficiency of supply by 
creating a primary market issuance structure that is steady and predictable.   Not only will a regular and 
planned issuance programme (as opposed to irregular tap issuance
33) aid the development of the 
secondary market as traders are more likely to go short
34 if they can rely on future issuance, it will also 
benefit the debt manager through higher fund-raising potential.  Providing the investor with as much 
information as possible and as far in advance as possible will help to minimise uncertainty for the 
investor and hence help to maximise the potential for active bidding behaviour.   
 
For the Ministry of Finance, planning issuance around a calendar requires forecasting of the 
government’s budgetary position;  but this is something that the Ministry of Finance should be doing 
anyway (ideally, the Ministry of Finance should distinguish between debt issuance for medium-term 
 
32 Underlying demand will reflect not only the investment needs of the market, but also liquidity requirements, whether 
voluntary or imposed on the banking system by the central bank (or other regulator). 
33 Tap issuance means making a fixed volume of a security available to the market for a period (which may vary from 
minutes to days) on a first-come, first-served basis. The asking price may be adjusted during this period. 




financing, and shorter-term cash management).   The calendar should also build in some flexibility to 
take account of any revisions to funding requirements.  For the central bank, planning regular issuance 
of liquidity management securities requires a medium-term forecast of market liquidity.  The central 
bank will need to take a view on whether surplus liquidity is likely to be sustained in the medium term, 
or grow or decrease;  and should take account of regular, seasonal changes in any surplus when 
planning issuance volumes and redemption dates.  It will be very helpful to market development if the 
central bank’s strategy is made public, and at least indicative figures published:   investors can then take 
a view on the likely volume of future issuance and the overall demand in the market. 
 
The chart below
35 shows the use of the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF:   short-term liquidity 
management) and the Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS:   issuance of longer-term securities for 
liquidity management) in India.  ‘The objective is to keep LAF for fine tuning on a day-to-day basis, 
while using MSS to manage sterilisation operations.’ MSS issuance can be planned on the basis of a 
medium-term liquidity forecast, and shows a relatively smooth profile, while the very short-term LAF 
responds to very short-term changes in liquidity.  The combination can work very effectively. 
 
 
Chart-6: RBI's Liquidity Management 













































































































































































In the United Kingdom, primary issuance of government securities before 1995 was via a mix of 
irregular tap issuance and auctions, with the debt manager (the Bank of England) taking advantage of 
short-term market movements to minimise the cost of government financing.   Following a review in 
1995 by the Treasury (UK Ministry of Finance), the primary issuance framework was adjusted to place 
a stronger emphasis on pre-commitment and transparency via a regular and planned calendar of debt 
auctions.  The report suggested that the government had been paying the market a premium for the 
uncertainty over supply inherent in the tap issuance programme.   The Debt Management Office 
(DMO)
36 assumed responsibility for UK debt management in 1998 and provides details of auction dates 
and the security type (conventional versus index-linked) one year ahead in its annual Remit.   The dates 
are chosen to avoid as far as possible market sensitive data releases including the Bank of England’s 
Monetary Policy Committee’s interest rate announcements.   Each quarter, consultations are held with 
the primary dealers (known as Gilt-edged
37 Market Makers (GEMMs)) and investors to ascertain their 
demand for particular maturities in the coming quarter.   The DMO’s policy is to issue along the yield 
                                                                       
35 Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, 26 April 2006. 
36 An executive agency of Her Majesty’s Treasury (the Ministry of Finance) - see  www.dmo.gov.uk.   




curve, which is divided for convenience into broad bands (shorts 1-7 years;  mediums 7-15 years;  longs 
over 15 years;  and index-linked).   The minutes of these meetings are published.   On the last working 
day of the quarter, the DMO will publish details of the specific securities to be auctioned in the 
following quarter, taking into account the market’s demand, the government’s risk appetite, the size and 
maturity structure of government securities outstanding, the shape and slope of the yield curve and the 
extent to which liquid benchmarks should be maintained.   In the week immediately prior to the auction, 
the remaining details such as the auction size and coupon rate are published.   
 
The debt manager will also need to consider what information should be published following the 
auction and to whom.   Information such as the bid/cover ratio, the average successful price and the 
stop-out (marginal) price will all help auction participants to evaluate their results in the primary auction 
and whether or not it is sensible to trade in the secondary market.   If the results are distributed more 




Who wants to trade? 
 
In the case of physical goods, markets will typically start to operate on a retail basis, with small scale 
producers selling direct to consumers.   Over time wholesale intermediaries will tend to appear, 
increasing the efficiency of the market.   But in the early days of a securities market’s development, it is 
likely to be only a wholesale market, dominated by banks, other financial institutions and enterprises.   
These securities may be held until redemption by those who purchase them in the primary market - 
perhaps because they are the best, or the only, investment opportunity.   Later on these purchasers will 
start to trade the securities in order to manage their liquidity positions and in order to earn profits as 
intermediaries (wholesalers) and, perhaps, by taking speculative positions.  Retail interest may grow in 
the ‘product’ later on, as the market matures.  Retail investors will tend to hold the securities purely as 
investments, and so keep them to redemption.    
 
In the early stages of a securities market, there is normally very little trading, if any.  Often this will 
reflect a shortage of investment instruments in a market, so holders do not want to sell;  but it may also 
be a function of participants’ lack of familiarity with trading, and lack of procedures.  As investment 
opportunities increase and/or excess liquidity is drained from the market, holders of securities will on 
occasion want to sell.  If a bank or other investor wants to switch into an alternative investment, it will 
want to sell the security outright;  but if it finds itself short of liquidity and judges the position to be 
temporary, it may prefer if possible to use the security as collateral for borrowing short-term funds.  
Both can support yield curve development, though at different points.  The former will provide market 
yields at whatever the residual maturity of the traded security happens to be (probably the shortest dated 
will be sold first), while the second will provide yields for repo (or collateralised lending), probably at 
more standardised maturities of a few weeks or maybe months. 
 
As two-way trading develops, some institutions are likely to take on the role of market makers ie they 
will stand ready to buy and sell securities on request.   This may be on an informal basis - participants in 
the market may come to know that certain institutions regularly buy and sell securities and so will use 
them as counterparties, but there is no commitment to quote bid-offer prices whether at all, or for a 
particular volume.  [Bid-offer prices will often vary depending on counterparty and size.   For example, 
a trade for 10 million with a regular customer might be given a more attractive (to the customer) price - 




                                                                      
there may be a formal market-making system, where certain specialist intermediaries commit 
themselves to making - either continuously or on request - bid-offer prices for at least a minimum trade 
size and maximum spread.   Normally such intermediaries would expect the authorities to offer them 
some form of privileges to offset this obligation.   Where such market makers exist, other market 
participants will be more comfortable with buying (or selling) securities, knowing that they will be able 
to reverse the transaction at a reasonable price in the future if they desire to do so.   The fear of getting 
locked into a position which cannot be reversed, or which can only be reversed at an excessive price, 
would deter a number of potential participants from playing an active role in the market. 
 
Since, as a rule, the privileges which offset the market making obligation (see below for examples) can 
only be offered by the authorities, they clearly have a role to play in the creation and maintenance of a 
formal market-making structure - if one is desired.  But it is possible for market participants to agree on 
mutual obligations without involvement of the authorities.  For instance, members of the MTS 
government securities trading platforms
38 may undertake an obligation to make a market in certain 
issues, as part of the membership agreement. 
 
Primary dealers and market makers 
 
The terms ‘Primary Dealer’ and ‘Market Maker’ are sometimes used almost interchangeably, although 
there are clear differences between an obligation to support the primary market (similar to an 
underwriting function), and one to support the secondary market (trading regularly, in both directions, 
with a wide range of counterparties).
39 In most countries, those firms that undertake primary dealer 
responsibilities also fulfill the role of market makers in the secondary market. 
 
Primary dealers exist in a number of countries to support government debt issuance;  but they do not 
normally have a role in the market for central bank securities, reflecting the different aims of the issuers. 
For example, a government will sell securities because it needs the funds, and it will want some comfort 
that an auction of securities will be covered;  but a central bank selling securities does so to drain excess 
liquidity held by the banks, and if the liquidity is genuinely excess, banks will be willing to invest it.
40 
In the first case, the government has a need which may be supported by the market;  in the second case, 
the market has a need which may be supported by the central bank.  The rest of this section focuses on 
the role of market markers. 
 
Market makers provide intermediary services to help develop a secondary market.   They fulfill the 
function of generating bids and offers and create liquid markets by consistently (ie not just in ‘fair 
weather’ conditions) quoting buy and sell prices to ensure a two-way market.   In addition, with the 
needs of wholesale and retail participants likely to be very different, in most developed countries there 
are effectively two markets, and market makers can help bridge these markets by intermediating 
between wholesale and retail demand. 
 
Their role exposes them to financial risk as they may not be able to sell at a reasonable price the 
securities they have bought, or to buy at a reasonable price securities which they have sold short.   
Hence market makers must have sufficient capital to warehouse open positions and withstand losses.   
 
38 See www.mtsgroup.org . 
39 Note that the US Primary Dealer system relates essentially to the Federal Reserve Bank’s monetary policy operations, not 
the Treasury’s debt issuance programme. The UK Gilt-edged Market Makers (GEMMs) have both primary and secondary 
market obligations which are detailed on the DMO website. 
40 This does not mean that a central bank bill auction will always be fully covered. If there is a low cut-off yield, or the 




                                                                      
This is particularly so in emerging markets where market liquidity may be quite high in bull (rising 
price) markets but extremely low in bear (falling) markets ie market makers often have to buy large 
quantities of securities in a bear market which can only be offloaded at a later stage.    
 
While some may act informally as market makers in good (profitable) trading conditions (‘fair weather’ 
market makers) or with valued clients, a commitment to fulfil such a role in all conditions and for all 
counterparties usually requires off-setting privileges.   Normally, only the authorities can offer the 
incentives needed to persuade institutions (whether banks or other financial companies) to take on the 
formal obligations of market maker to all investors.  Possible privileges which the authorities could 
offer, should they wish to create a market making system, include: 
 
-  a dealing relationship with the central bank and/or debt manager; 
-  privileged access to auctions of securities - eg  no pre-payment requirement;  ability to use 
telephone or electronic bidding; 
-  options on additional purchases of securities at a non-competitive price; 
-  favourable tax treatment; 
-  the right to trade in a dual capacity (principal or agent); 
-  the right to execute large orders away from the market (block trades); 
-  access to privileged information.  For instance in the United Kingdom, only market makers have 
access to interdealer broker screens, allowing them to see the volume and price of interdealer 
trades.   In other countries the information is more widely available (ie  anyone can view the 
screens) but participation in this part of the market is restricted;  and 
-  the right to borrow securities or take short positions in securities in order to be able to respond 
quickly to customer buy orders.   (The development of a government securities repo market will 
help to facilitate taking and covering short positions, but allows any participant in the repo market 
to do so.) 
 
As market makers are usually profit-maximising firms, it is important that their activity allows them the 
opportunity to generate profit.  As well as the fees and income that arise from any associated activities 
in dealing with for non-government securities, they will generate profits from the bid/offer spreads they 
apply to transactions.  While the spread is often small-perhaps below 5 basis points at the short end of a 
developed market’s yield curve-it should be large enough to cover market risks, and profits can be 
generated through the large volumes
41. 
 
However when considering what privileges, if any, to accord to a group of specialist dealers, the 
authorities must consider both the present stage of the market's development and plans for future 
development.   Some privileges might encourage the role of market makers but in the long term inhibit 
market growth.   At some point, it may be the case that the functioning of the market no longer requires 
the presence of market makers.   This does not necessarily mean these privileges should not be given, 
but rather that they should perhaps be given only for an interim period.   For example, in the United 
Kingdom equity market, liquidity in the large capitalisation stocks has developed to such an extent that 
market makers are no longer required in order to achieve a well-functioning secondary market;  instead 
an electronic order matching service-the London Stock Exchange’s Trading Service (SETS)-provides 
the service.   In contrast, for the less liquid mid and small cap stocks, traditional market making services 
continue to be provided as options for trading.   
 
41 Some countries allow what is known as ‘when-issued’ trading.  This is trading in the auction security in between the 
announcement of the auction and the auction itself (so at a time when the security may not yet legally exist), for settlement 
on the auction settlement date. As well as helping potential bidders to judge the expected price of the security, the process 
can also assist market makers in judging the width of their secondary market bid-offer spread.  




                                                                      
 
If the authorities opt for a market-making system as the centre of the market, they will need to authorise 
and supervise the market makers.   Both the government’s debt manager and other market participants 
need to be able to trust that the market makers are honest, competent and financially sound.   
Supervision - whether by a central bank or by another agency - does not equate to a guarantee, but it can 
provide a considerable degree of comfort and so help to oil the wheels of the market.  It is also 
important to ensure that any obligations agreed with the primary dealers/market makers can be 
monitored and enforced by the body conferring the privileges and imposing the obligations. 
 
But if official authorisation is required to deal in a market, or to deal in a certain part of a market, the 
authorities are introducing a barrier to entry.   If only a few institutions are allowed to, or are able, to get 
past this barrier, the authorities may be creating a non-competitive market
42.   It is important therefore 
in considering the design of a market structure and the likely participants to ensure as far as possible 
that competition is encouraged rather than hindered. 
 
In the United Kingdom, firms have to fulfill certain duties in order to receive the privileges associated 
with being a GEMM (Gilt-edged Market Maker).   The duties include supporting the auction process by 
bidding for a minimum share of the supply, obligations to provide firm two-way prices in benchmark 
securities for a minimum number of hours per day with a maximum spread and in a minimum size, and 
to provide market intelligence to the DMO.   The privileges include the exclusive right to bid at 
auctions, the development of a dealing relationship with the DMO which includes dialogue, as well as 
the potential income arising from fees and commissions in the primary market and the bid-offer spreads 
in the secondary markets.   To become a GEMM, the applicant firm must demonstrate a history of 
presence in the market, a viable business plan including balance sheet capability to withstand short-term 
losses arising from market making duties, adequate staffing and a long-term commitment to the gilt 
market as well as compliance with certain technical requirements




Having a diversified investor base can help bring stability and liquidity to a market.   It can also 
promote change with new ideas and practices (eg internationally recognised best practice in financial 
markets) brought to the attention of a perhaps insular market.   There are a variety of potential different 
market participants with their role depending in part on their investment time horizon:   some, such as 
traders and hedge funds, may specialise at the short end of the yield curve, while others operate at the 
longer end eg pension funds and insurance companies.    
 
Providing a level playing field in terms of access to the market is important for development.   In some 
countries there are restrictions preventing non-residents from participating actively in the markets.   
Some countries are concerned that non-residents may represent ‘hot’ money, which will result in market 
price volatility, possibly with destabilising effects on the exchange rate, rather than supporting longer-
term market deepening.   They may be right! However there are many potential benefits that non-
residents can bring to a market.   Non-residents may have different reasons for holding the assets and so 
react in different ways to new information, thereby preventing a herd mentality and instead achieving a 
diversified-and hence less risky-portfolio of investors.   Also, foreign investors may be more 
sophisticated and can act as a driving force for change and development in the domestic markets.   Their 
 
42 Using the Herfindahl index-see Annex 3-five market makers with equal market share would be on the borderline of a 
situation of market dominance and weak competitiveness.  




                                                                      
presence may put pressure on domestic companies to develop their business and lower their costs.   If 
foreign investors are encouraged into the domestic markets, it is important that the legal infrastructure is 
sufficiently developed to support this, with clear rules established regarding liquidation and bankruptcy. 
 
As noted, different investor groups will bring liquidity to different parts of the yield curve.   Each will 
have a different set of criteria governing their buy and sell decisions, from analysing current price 
trends, technical factors and volatility (typically all factors associated with investors focusing on the 
short-term time horizon) to economic fundamentals and model valuations (medium to long-term time 
horizon).   Traders and hedge funds for example typically concentrate on the ultra-short end of the yield 
curve, providing liquidity by trading trends and possibly also adding volatility;  arbitrage traders remove 
pricing inefficiencies and help to link up different markets, or different segments of the securities 
market (in some markets the yield curve is effectively segmented);  while pension funds and insurance 
companies typically dominate the long end of the yield curve with a fairly passive investment strategy-
possibly to the extent of buying and holding government securities to maturity.    
 
The retail market can sometimes get overlooked when considering the issue of market development.  
Indeed, in some countries where there is substantial domestic demand-there may be few creditworthy 
alternatives for retail investment-the government ignores this sector and borrows instead from the 
international capital markets.   The retail sector is a potentially excellent source of untapped demand 
and can provide a stabilising force, cushioning the more volatile impact of sales from institutional and 
foreign investors.   Advertising can help educate the retail investor and promote an investment culture.  
Both the government and the investor should be better off, if an efficient mechanism can be developed 
for distribution.
44 On the other hand, it needs to be recognised that some retail investors are particularly 
risk averse. 
 
The central bank and/or Ministry of Finance  
 
The central bank needs to decide if it will itself participate in the market - whether as principal, or, in 
the case of government securities, as agent of the Ministry of Finance - and, if so, what the purpose of 
such intervention is.   The need or justification for central bank intervention may change over time as 
the market develops. 
 
In theory, the central bank could trade in the secondary market in the hope of making a profit.   This, 
however, would tend to damage the market as other participants would view this as unfair, whether 
because the central bank has special knowledge - about future debt issuance, monetary policy, 
government finances in general - or simply because of its position.   On the other hand, the central bank 
should not expect over time to make a loss on secondary market transactions:    while profit and loss 
considerations should be secondary, a persistent loss from such operations would indicate that they were 
not being executed ideally and could even threaten the central bank’s independence if it eventually 
needed to be recapitalised
45. 
 
Whether or not a central bank trades in the secondary market, it will almost certainly aim to use 
government securities in the implementation of their monetary policy.  Using them as collateral, or in 
repo transactions, should not affect market prices or the longer-term yield curve, since the transactions 
 
44 In some emerging markets, there is a strong retail sector but inefficiencies in distribution and pricing mean that it is a 
relatively expensive source of funding for the government. 
45 Further discussion on these issues can be found in ‘Central bank financial strength, transparency and policy credibility’, 
Peter Stella, IMF Staff Papers vol 52 no .2, 2005; and ‘The role of central bank capital revisited’, Bindseil, Manzanares and 




                                                                      
will be unwound.  Buying or selling long-term securities as a form of long-term liquidity management 
should be expected to have some impact on the yield curve, and for this reason it makes sense for the 
central bank to plan any such operations in a way that minimises the impact on any particular segment 
of the curve.  But aside from that, some central banks participate in secondary markets for government 
securities for two, additional but connected, reasons:   to smooth price fluctuations (or reduce price 
volatility), and to enhance market liquidity.  They normally do so as agents of the Ministry of Finance, 
rather than on their own account (and should therefore use MoF balances, not the central bank’s own 
balance sheet).  The purpose of such intervention is not because liquidity and price stability in the 
markets are good things in themselves - the central bank would not, after all, pursue such goals in other 
markets, eg equity markets.  Rather, they judge that stability (though not of course rigidity) in the price 
of money - in this case that part of the yield curve indicated by government securities-will help the 
transmission of the central bank's monetary policy into the wider economy (a monetary policy goal);  
and because in the long run this should reduce uncertainty, encourage demand and so reduce the cost of 
government financing (a debt management goal). 
 
In the early stages of market development, where the market is still relatively thin, there may not be a 
sufficient regular volume of trade for participants to be sure of finding a counterparty to a trade without 
‘moving the market’.   That is to say, in principle a transaction can always be conducted at a price, but a 
seller might receive significantly less than the indicative, or ‘fair’, market price, or a purchaser might 
have to pay significantly above the fair market price.   In either case, the initiator of the transaction 
would risk making a loss, and this would, naturally, discourage participation.   The central bank could in 
these circumstances take on the role of market maker of last resort.   If so, it should set its bid-offer 
spread somewhat wider than the market norm, both in order to reduce the risk of making a loss on its 
portfolio and in order to encourage market participants to seek to deal with each other first, using the 
central bank only as a last resort.   Over time the central bank would hope that the need for such a role 
will disappear; and its operations should be structured in such a way as not to inhibit the development of 
the market.  In essence, this is similar in nature to the guidelines that central banks adopt when 
structuring their standing facilities for their monetary operations, where they have to consider not only 
the need for a liquidity providing service but also the implications for market development. 
 
Even in the early stages of market development, the central bank may well be able to stimulate or 
support trading without itself acting as a market maker of last resort.  For instance, if the market is long 
of liquidity, and the central bank has on its balance sheet a portfolio of government securities, it could 
sell these as part of its long-term liquidity management operations.  But in this case, it is best to do so as 
part of a planned operation, in which all banks can participate, rather than bilaterally, in response to the 
need of a particular bank
46.  If the market, or an individual bank, is short of liquidity, then the central 
bank can provide short-term liquidity using the securities held by the market as collateral:   the liquidity 
can be provided without the central bank needing to buy the securities outright.  But it could also 
provide domestic currency liquidity against the security of foreign exchange, so leaving any domestic 
currency denominated securities available for trading in the market.  These examples would clearly be 
monetary policy/liquidity management operations rather than secondary market operations in securities. 
 
Even when the securities markets are relatively deep, there may still be a case for intervention to reduce 
price volatility.   This is more clearly a debt management, rather than a monetary policy, operation.  
Most central banks in developed economies would not undertake such transactions on the grounds that 
ex ante it is not clear whether a price movement represents short-term volatility or a long-term 
 
46 Some central banks will on occasion sell securities directly to the bank or banks they know to have excess liquidity, rather 
than offering them to all potential market participants. But this pre-judges the market, and tends to favour banks which are 
already dominant in the financial sector. There should be no loss, and potentially much gain, from offering the securities 




development, and to make the wrong judgement would make the intervention both ineffectual and loss-
making.   Moreover, market participants, and some market makers in particular, will expect to profit 
from making judgements about the future movement of the market.   They may for instance purchase 
securities in the belief that interest rates and yields will fall, increasing the value of those securities.   If 
the central bank then intervenes to prevent or limit the fall in interest rates, the market participants may 
feel aggrieved.   This will tend to discourage active participation and so reduce market liquidity-in other 
words, if the central bank (or other debt manager) takes on a liquidity-provision role, it becomes harder 
for the market to fill the gap.   On the other hand, excessive price volatility will discourage participation 
by a number of investors.   If price volatility was clearly related to short-term factors - for instance 
short-term capital inflows leading to excess money market liquidity and so lower interest rates - then 
there may be a case,  for both monetary and security market policy reasons, to lean against the market 
and reduce the price fluctuations.   While some speculative traders might be disappointed, the 
authorities have an interest in encouraging more stable, longer-term investment in the market. 
 
Whether or not a central bank should undertake price smoothing intervention, and exactly when and 
how much, must be a matter of judgement.   That judgement can only be properly made if the central 
bank is well informed about the securities market and about related markets, and has some 
understanding of the causes of the undesired price movements.  But in general it is probably better for 
the central bank to restrict its intervention as price maker to the short end of the yield curve, and focus 
on appropriate management of liquidity and stabilisation of expectations to provide a good basis for 
more stability at the longer end of the yield curve-addressing the fundamentals rather than massaging 
the symptoms of uncertainty. If the central bank does intervene, there should be a clear and transparent 
mandate governing the terms on which it is done.  
 
Some debt managers operate repo facilities, where they make particular securities available to the 
market when there is a particular shortage, preventing settlement failures.  Again, this requires some 
care, as there may be market participants who hope to profit from holding such securities (securities 
which go ‘special’, in repo market parlance).  Where such facilities are offered, the terms on which the 
debt manager/central bank participates should be clear. 
 
The market place 
Well-known place and time 
 
Markets for physical goods typically operate in a fixed location and during regular hours, so that both 
sellers and purchasers know where and when to go in order to conduct business.  This focusing of trade 
into a known place and time benefits both parties, as the seller is more certain of finding purchasers for 
his goods, and the purchaser more certain of finding not only the desired goods, but a choice between 
different sellers.   The same holds true for a securities market, whether it is located in a physical place 
(an exchange floor) or-much more likely - exists electronically (remote trading via telephone or 
computer terminal).   It is much easier for traders to go to a market place/log on to a central system to 
find trade counterparties than to make a series of bilateral contacts in the hope of finding a suitable 
counterparty.   But this does not mean that off-market bilateral trading should not be permitted.  While 
‘the market’ may be narrowly defined as those transactions conducted at/on a recognised exchange, 
more broadly it could be taken to include all the bilateral, off-exchange, trades in the relevant 
commodity.  These bilateral trades may perform an important function in deepening the market.  There 
is however a strong case for centralised price reporting by wholesale market participants in order to 
strengthen price formation and certainty. 




                                                                      
In the early days of a market, there may be a role for the authorities in focusing trade into a known place 
and time, and hence enhancing competition within a market.  The authorities could provide a trading 
floor or system and trust that the market would naturally gravitate towards it;  or (as happened in some 
countries in the 1990s) they could insist that all dealing, or perhaps all deals conducted between 
specialist intermediaries, be conducted in that trading place.   Additionally, trading hours could be 
limited in the early stages, when there may not be enough business to ensure that trading opportunities 
will be available at any time of the day.   If such restrictions are imposed in order to focus the market 
and so facilitate its development and encourage competition, it is important to review them periodically, 
and ease or remove them when they are no longer necessary - ideally before they become an 
impediment to the market’s growth. 
 
There are a range of competition and efficiency issues which need to be considered as the markets 
develop:    
 
-  Ownership:   originally, exchanges were typically owned by the major wholesale users, and this 
continues to be the case for some.  But, especially for larger exchanges, widespread ownership can 
make change - not least to enhance market efficiency - hard to implement due to diversifying 
viewpoints.  And, as market shares change over time, should ownership shares change to take 
account of this, or should an exchange run on a one member-one vote principle?  
 
-  Can there be more than one exchange? Many participants favour at least the possibility of more 
than one exchange, to prevent the exchange - especially if not owned by users - from abusing a 
monopoly position.  Allowing OTC trading as well as exchange trading is important in this 
respect.  In practice, it is hard for more than one exchange to survive, unless there is a clear 
differentiation by purpose or user, as liquidity will tend to flow to a single point
47 . 
 
-  Should the exchange also own the settlement system? There are arguments that these should be 
separated, both for competition and for efficiency reasons.  In the United Kingdom, Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands there is horizontal integration - cross-border integration of the same 
functions.  On the other hand there are arguments that as much as possible of the market-
supporting infrastructure should be under single ownership, to facilitate technical co-ordination.  
In Germany, Italy and Spain there is vertical, or silo integration within the country.  There is a 
competition angle:   if one exchange owns the settlement system, it may be harder for a second 
exchange to compete, if it must use the settlement system owned by a competitor. 
 
-  In some countries, the exchange is the listing authority.  This gives the exchange some power, and 
may make it harder for competition to emerge.  This function can easily be separated from the 
exchange eg the UK Listing Authority was transferred from the London Stock Exchange to the 
Financial Services Authority (the United Kingdom's financial regulator) in 2000.  (There is likely 
also to be a distinction in supervision between the exchanges and settlement systems.  Participants 
share information across an exchange, and will want some comfort that accurate information is 
being displayed.  But a settlement system is used to transfer value (securities and money), and 
users may require a much higher degree of comfort that their assets are safe there, both during 
transactions and otherwise.) 
 
 
47 Eg in the United Kingdom in the 1990s, the independently run Tradepoint Investment Exchange failed in its bid to 
become a viable and long-term competitor of the larger and more established London Stock Exchange (‘LSE’), as UK equity 




                                                                      
-  Should the exchange be involved in developing codes of conduct for business? There is certainly a 
case for involving the exchange; but the wider market should be involved in agreeing such codes, 
particularly where codes of conduct go beyond transactions on the exchange itself. 
 
-  In general, anything which gives monopoly power to a service provider risks abuse of that position 
(possibly just by failure to provide the most efficient service);  but a market-led solution may 
nonetheless be for a single provider for certain services, with checks to control risk of abuse. 
 
There are clearly benefits to a dematerialised trading place, provided the costs of systems and the 
country’s communications infrastructure will support this.  A dematerialised trading platform means 
that there can be a single (virtual) market for all participants, whether resident or not, rather than-for 
example-one platform for each major city.  This broadens the market, and increases the likelihood of 
matching buy and sell orders;  and it allows for a single price for the whole market.  Both factors will 
enhance liquidity.  But if this is not possible, then it is better to have one or several physical trading 
places than none at all;  and the publication of information eg by radio can help to tie the various 
geographical markets together reasonably effectively. 
 
Visible (indicative) market price 
 
Participants in a securities market will be more willing to trade if they have a reasonable certainty that 
they are trading at a ‘good’ price, and that they will be able to reverse the trade in the future - if 
necessary - at a good price.   Price visibility facilitates this and so will help in the development of a 
secondary market.   And the characteristics of secondary markets in securities are conducive to price 
transparency:   there are typically only a few products (in some markets there may only be a handful of 
different government securities available);  the quality is uniform;  there are normally fewer traders in 
the market;  and prices of the latest deals, or bid and offer prices, can be displayed publicly for all to see 
- electronically where possible as this is faster than newspapers  and more permanent than radio or 
television. 
 
Price reporting in securities markets is important for the retail market.  In the cash market, deposit rates 
for the retail sector will usually be much lower than interbank rates (because amounts deposited are 
smaller), while loans rates may be much higher (because of increased credit risk)
48.  But in the 
securities markets, where the product is normally homogenous whether it is traded by the wholesale or 
retail sector
49, retail investors may expect the price they pay/receive to be the same as that available to 
the wholesale market.  (Retail investors will often have to pay a larger spread, or percentage fee, 
however;  or it may be that a fixed commission is large as a percentage of a retail trade, but trivial in the 
wholesale market.)  Publication of wholesale prices in securities (and in the foreign exchange market) 
will be of more interest and importance to the retail market than would be the case with, say, the 
interbank market. The authorities may therefore require publication of certain market data.  In most 
cases, the market would want to publish these data anyway. 
 
There are three broad types of data disclosure: 
 
-  Where government securities are traded on an exchange platform, the exchange typically 
publishes - on an anonymous basis - the size and price of the most recent transactions.  In the 
United Kingdom and other countries, where the market is largely OTC, market makers are 
 
48 Eg some retail deposits and loans may be linked to interbank rates-eg some corporate loans, and many UK mortgages. 
49 Some governments eg United Kingdom and Germany issue certain securities specifically for the retail sector, while 




members of the main exchange and are required to report transactions data for publication-both on 
an aggregated basis and on a trade by trade basis.  There are two areas of contention: 
 
o  How soon should data be published? In some countries, market makers can delay 
publication of data on large trades, on the grounds that very rapid (eg  within a few 
minutes) publication could help competing firms unduly; and  
 
o  Should bids and offers, and trades between market makers be published real-time? In the 
United Kingdom, for instance, broker screens used by market makers to trade with each 
other are not available to the rest of the market; 
 
-  In some countries the specialist intermediaries are required to publish bid-offer spreads on certain 
securities;  in the United Kingdom, GEMMs (Gilt-edged Market Makers) are required to quote 
firm two-way prices on benchmark securities, for specified minimum sizes within specified 
maximum bid-offer spreads and for a minimum number of hours per day.  This is done both to 
inform and to facilitate the market. 
 
-  In some countries - including the United Kingdom - the authorities are responsible for publishing 
the official ‘reference’ price for each government security at the end of each trading day.  These 
data will be widely available, and allows retail investors to participate in the market with a 
reasonable idea of recent prices (retail investors are not normally quite as price sensitive as 
wholesale market participants).  The data may also be used for tax purposes.  Part of the data 
published by the United Kingdom’s DMO for 7 April 2006 - taken from its website - are shown 
below
50.  In some countries, the central bank may be in the best position to gather and publish 
such data eg if it runs both the payment and the settlement systems. 
 
Stock ID  Stock Name  ISIN Code  Clean Price  Dirty Price Yield
7TTY06  7 3/4 Treasury 2006  GB0008916024  101.350000  102.044973 4.379082
9TCV06  9 3/4 Conversion 2006  GB0009021956  103.100000  107.032320 4.414499
7HTY06  7 1/2 Treasury 2006  GB0009998302  101.970000  104.524945 4.421630
4HTY07  4 1/2 Treasury 2007  GB0034040740  100.100000  100.515761 4.382249
8HTY07  8 1/2 Treasury 2007  GB0009126557  105.020000  106.992376 4.377448
7QTY07  7 1/4 Treasury 2007  GB0009997114  104.470000  106.939780 4.421046
5TY08  5 Treasury 2008  GB0031734154  101.040000  101.501957 4.423217
                                                                       




                                                                      
 
5.  Developing the infrastructure 
 
The development of a well-functioning and liquid money market and secondary market in government 
securities requires a robust and competitive market infrastructure.   The authorities can promote this in a 
number of ways. 
Supervision and risk management 
 
The objectives of the supervisory authorities, (both central banks and other bodies), include not only the 
prudential regulation of individual firms, but also ensuring fair, efficient and orderly markets;  providing 
appropriate investor protection;  and minimising systemic risk.    The prevention of financial crime 
(including money laundering) is usually part of the remit for supervisory authorities.  But while 
regulation of markets provides clear benefits, there are also costs:   over-regulation can inhibit market 




International standards for risk management undertaken by banks have been developed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision.   The first framework on capital standards, known informally as 
Basel I, dates back to 1988.   A new version, formally titled ‘International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards:   A Revised Framework’ and informally known as Basel II, was 
finalised in 2005 and is designed to secure international convergence on regulations governing the 
capital adequacy of internationally active banks
51.   However, while the central banks and banking 
supervisors of the thirteen countries represented on the Basel Committee have endorsed the Basel II 
framework, it nevertheless has no binding authority until it is translated into national banking law and 
regulatory policy.   For the EU, Basel II is being implemented through the Capital Requirements 
Directive - all EU Directives are binding on all Member States - and will apply to all credit institutions 
and investment firms ie not just internationally active banks as the Basel Committee originally 
envisaged.  In the United States, banking regulators currently only require the largest banking groups to 
adopt Basel II standards. 
 
The intention in Basel II is to link capital requirements more closely to the risk involved.   The 
framework permits firms to use more sophisticated approaches to credit risk management through using, 
within certain parameters, their own internal methods of assessing risk for regulatory capital purposes
52. 
This highlights the need for supervisory authorities to take account of the governance and management 
and controls in the firms that they supervise.   In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA)
53 is responsible for the prudential supervision of most financial institutions, allocating its time 
and resources on a risk-weighted basis.  Its remit also covers aspects of corporate governance and 
management.   All firms, both wholesale and retail and irrespective of size, are required to have in place 
a clear and robust system of management and control. 
 
51 Further details are available on the BIS website www.bis.org.  
52 E.g the Internal Ratings-Based approaches for credit risk. 
53The FSA is an independent non-governmental body, given statutory powers by the Financial Services and Markets Act 




                                                                      
Disclosure 
 
The timely and equitable release of price sensitive information is an important part of market 
infrastructure.   The International Accounting Standards (IAS) provides guidelines on this, and most 
supervisory authorities will also have their own prudential disclosure requirements.  Of course, the 
authorities, where possible, should aim to meet their own guidelines.  The Bank of England, for 
example, releases the results of its operations in the sterling money markets within a maximum of 
fifteen minutes after the invitation to bid is published to counterparties
54.   The information is provided 
on the wire services to all market participants, allowing them to judge the market’s net sterling liquidity 




Investor protection is more relevant to the retail than wholesale market.   Retail investors may ask:   is 
the price appropriate to the time and the volume of the transaction? Is advice given by ‘professional’ 
financial advisers to retail investors appropriate?  Are financial intermediaries trustworthy?  While 
wholesale market participants should have the expertise and resources to formulate their own answers to 
such questions, retail investors may not.  And both wholesale and retail market participants will take 
some comfort from the knowledge that the market is well supervised (or, of course, will enter the 
market with caution if they perceive supervision to be weak).   
 
The supervisory authorities may do a number of things to promote investor protection. 
 
•  They may restrict entry to the market to those firms and individuals that attain the necessary 
criteria, which can include honesty, competence and financial soundness.   This gatekeeper role 
may extend to requiring individuals such as financial traders and advisers to sit and pass 
regulated exams (a type of ‘fit and proper’ test). 
   
•  Firms that pass these entry standards need to be monitored to ensure that they maintain a 
satisfactory level of performance.  In the United Kingdom, all firms regulated by the FSA are 
expected to comply with the principles set out in the ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ regime.  This 
emphasises that it is the responsibility of firms’ senior management to ensure fairness 
throughout the life-cycle of a product or service and not only at the point of sale.  Supervisory 
focus on this issue also encompasses the terms that apply to standard consumer contracts and 
the marketing and other material that firms provide.   Indeed the FSA require all firms 
undertaking mortgage and general insurance business to provide consumers with ‘Key Facts’ 
documentation, designed to simplify and focus the information about a product, including risk 
warnings.   
 
•  In some countries, supervisors have developed an education programme for investors so that 
they take on an increasing responsibility to protect their own interests.   In the United Kingdom, 
the FSA has taken initiatives to improve the financial capability of UK consumers, in order to 
help them avoid mis-buying.   The FSA is working with partners to develop a national strategy 
 




                                                                      
for improvement;  within this, a web-based financial health check was launched in June 2005 in 
partnership with BBC Online
55.    
 
•  In some countries, investors are ultimately protected by insurance schemes:   these schemes, 
usually funded by market participants, return for example an investor’s deposit-within certain 
limits-if a bank becomes bankrupt
56.  The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) is 
the United Kingdom's statutory fund of last resort for customers of authorised financial services 
firms.  The FSCS is operationally independently of the FSA, though subject to FSA rules, and 
can pay compensation if a firm is unable, or likely to be unable, to pay claims against it.  In 
recent years, most of the firms concerned have been independent financial advisers affected by 
claims arising from past mis-selling.    
 
Contagion and systemic risk 
 
The risk of contagion (and hence systemic risk) can be reduced by ensuring that individual market 
participants manage their risk appropriately.   But, while prudential supervision focuses on the micro-
risks of each individual market participant, the big-picture macro view - potential linkages between 
market participants and their exposures - should not be overlooked.  This may or may not be done by 
the same body that is responsible for micro supervision.   In several countries, including the United 
Kingdom, where the central bank does not have responsibility for prudential regulation, the central bank 
still has a role in monitoring financial stability in the market as a whole, in particular for the financial 
markets’ infrastructure.   Where responsibilities are split between macro and micro supervision, 
adequate co-ordination should be ensured so that appropriate action can be taken to avoid, and if not 
possible, manage crises.   In the United Kingdom, a published Memorandum of Understanding sets out 
the specific responsibilities regarding financial stability for the FSA, HM Treasury (Ministry of 
Finance) and the Bank of England.   A Tripartite Standing Committee composed of representatives of 
the three bodies, meets on a monthly basis to exchange information and would co-ordinate the response 
in the event of a crisis
57.   
 
As well as a macro supervisory role, the central bank (or supervisory agency) may also have an 
oversight role of the market.   This may involve initiating and participating in working groups to agree 
common standards of behaviour (codes of best practice) to be observed and used by market participants. 
  Such standards are often voluntary rather than legal requirements, as this allows them to develop 
flexibly.   But they will be widely observed, as most market participants will refuse to trade with 
counterparties who do not commit themselves to observing these standards.   The central bank may also 
have a role in monitoring market observance of such standards, and maybe in adjudicating in disputes 
between participants.   While in principle the market could develop such standards without official 
involvement, the central bank often has a relative advantage in bringing together appropriate working 
groups and chairing meetings (because of its central role in the financial system and its neutrality among 
commercial institutions);  and it clearly has an interest in the proper development of these standards as 
they improve market efficiency, reduce uncertainties and so increase demand and participation.   
 
The Bank of England chairs the Securities Lending and Repo Committee (SLRC), a UK - based 
committee that brings together international repo and securities lending practitioners, together with the 
 
55 Access is available at:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/business/healthcheck/index.stm . For further details on FSA's 
work regarding consumer protection, details are available at www.fsa.gov.uk/consumer/index.html
56 There is normally a maximum claim that can be made on such schemes;  and some cover only a percentage eg 80% of any 
given deposit. 




                                                                      
Financial Services Authority, CREST (UK settlement system), the DMO (UK debt manager), the Inland 
Revenue (UK government tax department), the London Clearing House and the London Stock 
Exchange.  The committee, which meets quarterly, provides a forum in which structural (including 
legal) developments in the relevant markets can be discussed by practitioners and the authorities.  It has 
been responsible for the publication of the ‘Gilt Repo Code of Best Practice’, ‘Equity Repo Code of Best 
Practice’ and the ‘Stock Borrowing and Lending Code of Guidance’
58.   The Bank of England also 
chairs the ‘Sterling Money Market Liaison Group (MMLG)’.   This group also meets quarterly and has 
a similar remit for the money markets as the SLRC does for the securities markets
59.   However, it may 
be more appropriate in less developed countries, for the central bank (or supervisory agency) to play a 
more formal role in the oversight of the wholesale markets. 
 Payment and settlement systems 
 
The payment and settlement systems are a key part of the infrastructure of the market.  Some people 
liken them to the plumbing of the system:   necessary for liquidity to flow to the right place, but often 
ignored or thought of as unimportant unless they are blocked or leak.  One recent study
60 suggests that:  
 ‘For emerging countries, the central bank involvement in the payment system is the most relevant 
variable in fostering financial development.’ 
 
Banks use wholesale payment systems to make transfers on behalf of customers (eg tax payments, 
payment for securities or property purchases and other domestic payments
61);  and they make transfers 
on their own behalf.  The latter will often be more time-critical, and relate to liquidity management as 
well as yield curve management.  Securities instruments may also be involved, often in dematerialised 
form
62.  For these transactions to take place, payment and settlement systems must have certain 
features. It is essential that users of the systems trust the operator and regard it as efficient.  Risk of loss 
or delay will discourage some trades, and may at the margin lead some potential participants to stay out 
of the market altogether.  These systems do not have to be provided by the central bank, but the central 
bank is almost universally seen as the best provider of the wholesale payment system;  and in some 
countries the central bank may in practice be the only body which can combine the necessary expertise 
and trustworthiness to run a securities settlement system.   In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England 
built the current securities settlement system CREST in 1996, but subsequently relinquished ownership; 
 CREST is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Euroclear Bank, facilitating dematerialised real-time 
settlement for UK,  Irish and CREST international securities. 
 
The central bank has its own strong interest in the development of sound payment and settlement 
systems.   By providing the means for secured interbank lending - eg  via securities repo or 
collateralised lending - and secured central bank lending to the banking system, they facilitate the 
central bank's monetary policy and liquidity management operations, as well as supporting financial 
stability.  They will also facilitate its role as fiscal agent to the government. 
 
 
58 All are available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/gilts/slrc.htm . 
59 An article in the Winter 2001 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin put the work of the MMLG and the SLRC in context 
with the Bank’s other market liaison and intelligence activities. 
60 ‘Why do countries develop more financially than others? The role of the central bank and banking supervision’, April 
2003, Herrero, Herrero and Saez. 
61 Banks do of course make cross-border payments for customers, but with the exception of the euro area, these do not 
normally use a structured payment system, although correspondent banking transfers do frequently use a structured 
messaging system (notably SWIFT). 
62 Dematerialisation means that securities do not exist in physical form;  legal title to ownership is established on the basis of 
an electronic record. In some countries, old legislation requires that a physical document exist;  but a single global security 




                                                                      
Two key milestones in the development of these systems have led to a reduction in risk:    Real Time 
Gross Settlement (RTGS) systems and the dematerialization, or at least immobilization, of securities.   
RTGS systems are wholesale payment systems that settle in central bank money continuously 
throughout the day, with direct access normally restricted to banks.   These systems ensure that payment 
notifications from the payer occur only if funds transfer has taken place across the central bank’s books, 
a transfer that is normally deemed legally final, and so avoiding intraday settlement risk.   This is in 
contrast to deferred settlement systems where for example the payment message might be sent early in 
the morning, but settlement might take place only at the end of the trading day.    
 
In the United Kingdom, an RTGS payment system was introduced in 1996.   Prior to that, the sterling 
high value payment system - known as CHAPS - operated on a deferred net basis.  This meant that 
banks exchanged payment messages during the day, but settled the accumulated amounts on a 
multilateral net basis only at the end of the day.  There were no mechanisms to monitor or contain the 
exposures that members ran up with each other during the day.  In terms of liquidity management, there 
is a big difference between (i) receiving notification at, say, 10:00 that a payment has been made, and 
(ii) receiving notification at the same time that payment should be made at, say, 18:30 when the 
payment system closes;  or (iii) simply receiving notification the following day that a payment has been 
made.  An increase in the certainty and timeliness of payment information allows banks to trade more 
freely in the interbank market, and at more stable interest rates (difficulty in managing short-term 
liquidity is a key driver of short-term interest-rate volatility).  If a bank is concerned that making an 
interbank loan will result in its account at the central bank going overdrawn or a need to use a standing 
credit facility at a penal rate, it may not lend at all, or will try to price in the risk involved.  But if the 
payment system tells it that it has surplus funds available on its account at the central bank, and allows 
it to transfer those funds same-day, then it will be able to make an interbank loan with certainty about 
availability of funds and avoiding recourse to a penal facility.  Improvements in payment system 
structure and operational reliability will therefore tend to benefit the interbank market. 
 
Rapid and reliable settlement of securities also promotes trading and so liquidity.  A market maker can 
take a short position (ie sell a security to a customer even if it does not hold that security in its portfolio) 
provided it can purchase that security in the market and expect to take delivery in time to pass on to its 
customer.  By contrast, if settlement takes weeks after trade date, on-selling the security before 
settlement could result in a chain of unsettled trades, with unclear liabilities and risk.  Even if the 
market is prepared to work on this basis (it has happened), the supervisor should be reluctant to permit 
it. 
 
The dematerialisation or immobilisation of securities not only eliminates the risk (and cost) of handling 
paper securities, by allowing book-entry transactions, but it also permits the introduction of Delivery 
versus Payment (DvP).  DvP (and Payment versus Payment - PvP - for foreign exchange transactions) is 
a mechanism that permits the simultaneous exchange of value in the system so that one side only 
delivers value (eg the security) when the other side makes the payment
 63.   In the Unite Kingdom, DvP 
in is now possible in the securities market, following the introduction of central bank money in 
CREST
64.  When some years ago Mexico introduced a book-entry system for government securities, 
permitting DvP, secondary market activity increased sharply;  more recently, India has seen a similar 
pattern when it moved from a paper-based multiple-book system to a unified electronic record 
permitting national trading of securities.  In some countries (for instance, until recent years in Egypt and 
Poland), DvP is possible for treasury bills - where the central bank is the depository - but not for longer-
 
63 Continuous Linked Settlement is a recent example of cross-border PvP in central bank money. 




term bonds, where the stock exchange runs a separate depository.  Trading volumes are then typically 
much higher for the bills because of the possibility of DvP. 
 
The [central] securities depository (often though not always the same as the settlement system) should 
also support the use of securities as collateral.   If securities can easily be used as collateral - both 
legally and in the operation of the payment and settlement systems - then this may, especially in a 
developing or transitional economy, help the development of secondary markets, as lenders will be able 
to take good security with (relatively) low price risk.   This in turn should increase the demand for 
securities.   Registration and custody should be straightforward for wholesale market participants, who 
will normally have their own accounts in the (centralised) settlements system.  But for retail participants 
the costs and/or complexity of using the centralised settlement system may be off-putting.   In market 
economies it is commonplace for financial intermediaries (such as the large banks) to offer custody (or 
nominee) services.   Here, the intermediary holds the securities on its account in the centralised 
settlement system (and is therefore the legal owner) and manages its own register of the beneficial 
owners of the securities. In such systems the retail participant needs to have confidence in the 
intermediary and the effectiveness of its register database, since the intermediary will retain legal 
ownership of the security which has been sold to its client.  (In practice this may be little different to 
trusting a bank with a deposit.)   In some countries the government effectively offers a custodial service 
to retail customers in the government securities market.   This service may be slower than the 
centralised settlement system, but for most retail customers speed is not essential. 
 
Building a real-time gross settlement system, which is technically complex and demanding on electronic 
data transfer, can take years.  While countries may reasonably aim for ‘state-of-the-art’ systems, the 
jump from very basic system to highly complex does not need to be made in one go;  and markets might 
find it difficult to make such a leap conceptually.  Some markets therefore start with simple and cheap 
interim systems, which can be introduced relatively rapidly and which can help prepare users for more 
complex systems later on, while providing substantial benefits to the markets during the development 
and build phase of the more complex system.  When government securities were first introduced in the 
Republic of Georgia, the settlement system was a PC spreadsheet, with the option of moving the book 
from the National Bank of Georgia to the exchange (to allow rapid accounting of trades) by means of a 
normal diskette.  If there are only a handful of trades each week, such a system is adequate.  As the 
market developed, a system which can cope with a larger volume of trades was of course needed.  
Similarly, in Afghanistan a simple payment system was introduced in 2005 while the payments team 
was continuing work on development of a more complex system.  The approach, seeing the simple 
‘introductory’ system and the more complex system as complementary rather than as competing 
alternatives, may be appropriate to many markets.  That said, it may make sense to by-pass some stages. 
 A number of countries in central Europe moved from retail cash payments to electronic transfer of 
funds, without the stage of paper cheques:   these were seen as based on outdated technology, rather 
than as a useful ‘interim’ development.   
 
v) Conduct of business rules and legal risk 
 
A robust legal framework in the government securities market - ie one which provides rules on how the 
primary and secondary markets function - will aid market development by providing market participants 
with some legal certainty that the validity of trades will be upheld in the court of law. 
 
This framework - possibly in the shape of regulations or market standards, rather than primary 




                                                                      
to be conducted
65, rules on secondary market trading (eg whether trading is to be conducted on or off a 
recognised exchange;  and duties and privileges surrounding market makers) as well as regulations 
defining the legal properties of government securities and their use effectively as collateral in 
transactions such as repo.   As with all areas of risk management, there needs to be a balance between 
the need for control and the desire for a flexible framework which can provide an environment for 
market development.   For example, a requirement for the debt manager to seek authorisation through 
legislation on each occasion that it wishes to issue debt would clearly not facilitate an efficient 
operation. 
 
As well as an overarching legal framework that can provide certainty in the market, legal agreements 
and market standards should be used to provide protection to market participants on a trade-by-trade 
basis.   Bilateral legal agreements will detail precisely how a trade is to be conducted, from the initiation 
through to settlement and registration.   The agreement will include details on issues such as how the 
interest day count is calculated;  how accrued interest is calculated (eg on a clean or dirty price 
convention);  what the legal basis of the instrument is;  when legal title transfers and whether it does so 
in certain types of trade
66;  and when to call a failure to deliver.   
 
As cross-border trading increases, it is imperative that standard conventions are used in legal 
agreements.   For example what would happen if bank A from country Z defaulted, having lent 
government securities issued by country P to bank B in country X?  Which jurisdiction’s law would be 
used for the basis of any decision making process?  A legal agreement should clarify this, though it is 
imperative that trade partners have checked that their legal agreement is enforceable across the relevant 
jurisdictions.    
 
The use of legal master agreements can reduce the cost associated with drawing up these agreements.     
These master agreements act as an umbrella over all of the trades conducted between two counterparties 
in a particular instrument over a defined period of time, and hence using these is easier and more cost 
effective than signing individual agreements for each trade.   In the international repo market, the 
ISMA/TBMA Global Master Repurchase Agreement (‘GMRA’) and the European Banking 
Federation’s European Master Agreement dominate.  Central banks can help to encourage the use of 
robust legal agreements by ensuring that their legal agreements with market participants are of best 
market practice and hence can be used as a benchmark.   For example a number of central banks, 
including the Bank of England, use an adapted version of the ISMA/TBMA GMRA in their dealings 
with counterparties for monetary policy operations.    
 
65 Eg delegation of responsibilities to a debt manager (perhaps the central bank) and disclosure responsibilities.  On the 
latter, a framework that provides for timely public announcements of the government’s auction calendar will facilitate 
increased certainty in the market about the supply of securities and hence will contribute to secondary market liquidity. 
66 In economic and accounting terms, a secured loan and a repo transaction look similar. With a collateralised loan or 
documented repo, the seller retains the credit risk exposure for the securities so, if the issuer defaults, the seller is responsible 
for replacing them with equivalent value securities.  The seller also retains the market risk exposure:  the repurchase price is 
set equal to the original sale price despite the possibility that the value of the securities may have either increased or 
decreased in the secondary market during the life of the repo trade.  Since the seller retains the risk, the return potential is 
also retained:  the security will accrue interest during the life of the repo trade yet the repurchase price will not reflect this.  
But the transactions carry very different legal protection. A documented repo affords the cash lender the legal ownership of 
the underlying securities during the life of the repo transaction, so that if the cash borrower defaults, the cash lender has the 
right to advance all outstanding trades with the counterparty to maturity (‘right of close out’) and sell the securities in the 
secondary market in order to try and recoup its monetary losses (‘right of set-off’). A secured loan, on the other hand, does 
not provide the cash lender with the legal ownership of the security:  title to the security must first be taken-and this may be 




                                                                      
 
Liquidity risk and electronic trading 
 
Liquidity risk is the risk that a market participant will be unable to liquidate its position in a timely 
manner and at a reasonable price.    
 
In the secondary market, structures can vary from over-the-counter markets to organised exchanges and 
many hybrid systems.   Which mechanism, platform or structure is used for trading  a particular asset 
class depends on the standardisation of the underlying asset;  the size and sophistication of the 
participants;  and other factors such as regulations, cost (trading costs on automated systems can be 3-4 
times lower than traditional voice brokering/open outcry for the wholesale investor) and historical 
factors.   Foreign exchange and government/central bank securities markets tend to be more liquid than 
corporate securities or equities, and so are more likely to trade well on an electronic platform.   But 
electronic order-matching systems might not work well for smaller, less liquid equities, where a market 
making system might be more suitable.   
  
Trading can move quickly from one system to another as technology evolves and participants’ needs 
change:   if a market stands still, there is a danger that liquidity will desert it for another more 
competitive market.   For example, while trading in government securities has typically been conducted 
via telephone new technologies have led to the increasing use of electronic trading, such as the MTS 
platforms in Europe
67.  Similarly, some foreign exchange trading has moved to multilateral electronic 
platforms such as EBS 
68.   And most futures exchanges have moved from a physical trading floor to an 
electronic platform (a move that most stock exchanges made much earlier, as their operations were 
technically less demanding).   To remain competitive, the market structure must remain appropriate.  It 
may be easier to allow competition in trading platforms (or bilateral operations) than in settlement 
infrastructure.  But it is uncommon for multiple platforms to compete for very long, unless there is clear 
differentiation (eg between wholesale and retail trading for the same products);  the benefits of 
deepening liquidity means that one platform will tend to dominate. 
 
Central banks and other authorities may well have a direct role to play in influencing market structure.    
The central bank may in particular, at a certain stage of market development, play a direct role by 
regulating where trading in certain markets - such a centralised money markets, or central bank bill 
market - can take place and who is eligible to trade.   Usually though, as system liquidity improves, 
formal requirements are lessened and instead the central bank’s role may to limited to one of oversight.   
Taxation 
 
The taxation regime should raise sufficient revenue, but not unduly hinder the development of the 
financial markets.   It is important that those responsible for taxation policy are aware of how financial 
instruments work and what impact new taxation legislation will have on the markets.   Several central 
banks therefore liaise regularly with the Ministry of Finance, to discuss the potential implications of tax 
raising initiatives on the development of the financial markets.   
 
In the long run, there should be a level taxation playing field for taxation of all financial products and 
investors.   All products (both Government and corporate) and investors (wholesale and retail) should 
be either exempt from tax or liable to tax on the same terms.   There are of course exceptions in 
practice.   In the 1990s, the Hungarian government had a relatively high borrowing requirement and an 
 
67 www.mtsgroup.org . 




illiquid government debt market.   Between 1992 and 1996 the government provided special tax 
conditions for investment funds in order to encourage them to invest in government debt. But it is 
difficult to guage the real cost of such tax exemptions, and they risk complicating markets rather than 
promoting balanced development. 




                                                                      
 
6.  Sequencing of market development 
 
Interbank market development is often held up by (i) excess domestic currency liquidity in the market, 
so that there are few or no borrowers in the market and (ii) market segmentation, where certain banks do 
not trust others, or perhaps will not deal with them in order to discourage competition.  The central bank 
can certainly tackle the first problem - though there will be costs involved
69.  The second problem is 
more complex and will take longer to resolve.  Good banking supervision and published accounts are 
important here. 
 
Foreign exchange trading will happen at the retail level, sometimes in a black market if there are rules 
restricting participation in the market.  Economic efficiency will be served if large-value and long-
distance payments can be moved onto a non-cash basis.  Again, the central bank can play an important 
role by promoting suitable regulations (and removing harmful ones), as well as supporting the necessary 
infrastructure development. 
 
In the early stages of the development of a government securities market, priority should be given to the 
short end of the yield curve.   The objective within the primary market is to move away from funding 
from a captive market (eg government financing from the central bank) and to develop a diversified 
investor base.   Developing a government securities auction programme that is transparent, with market-
determined pricing, and with issuance focusing on benchmark securities at the short end of the yield 
curve, is a start.   Improving the infrastructure - notably the payment and settlement systems (such as 
introducing dematerialisation and DvP), but also risk management and supervision-are very important. 
Small investments to provide workable interim systems, while waiting for more sophisticated systems to 
be built (the more sophisticated systems often take years to install, and longer before they are actively 
used) may well remove bottlenecks to market growth.  The introduction of an open securities repo 
market and a move by the central bank towards indirect instruments for its money market operations can 
also help to promote liquidity. 
 
As development moves on, the authorities can start to turn their attention to the longer part of the yield 
curve.   This will require a more robust development of the secondary market in order to make longer-
maturity securities more attractive, particularly where banks are important investors.  The repo market 
can help here as it will allow investors with a preference for short-term investments, and for whom 
liquidity is important, to move into longer-term instruments without being afraid of not being able to 
sell the securities when they wish/need to do so.   It may also be possible to introduce Primary Dealers 
to foster competition and provide some reassurance over the coverage of auctions.   These dealers can 
also take up market making roles in the secondary market to help provide two-way liquidity flows.    
 
It is sometimes suggested that markets will see development in the following order:   foreign exchange, 
money markets, government securities, corporate fixed-interest securities and then equities.  This does 
represent a hierarchy of risk
70;  but there may be benefits to encouraging all to develop at as early a 
stage as the market will support.  If there is a shortage of investment assets in the economy, holders of 
securities will not trade them, and yields may be artificially low.  But if equities are available as well as 
government securities, the additional supply of assets might encourage more trading.  That is not to say 
that everything should be done at once.  It is simply not possible for any new legislation to cover all 
 
69 CCBS Lecture Series no. 6-‘Managing Surplus Liquidity’ www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/ls/pdf/lshb06.pdf
 explores this issue. 
70 Short-term interest rates;  longer-term rates;  longer-term rates plus credit risk;  business/profitability risk, which may be 




markets at the same time, or for supervisors to expand their coverage very rapidly, or for market 
infrastructure all to be introduced at the same time.  Legal, infrastructure and supervisory changes need 
time to be introduced and absorbed.  There would be risks in trying to go too fast.  But if the supply of 
assets to the market is too slow, market development will be held back.  A different ‘sequencing’ might 
be:   macroeconomic stability;  legislation and infrastructure;  and then good short-term liquidity 
management by the central bank.  Trading will then happen.   
 
It is crucial that the cycle of development continues, and that the authorities continue to work towards 





7.  Conclusions 
 
There are a number of areas in which central bank involvement can significantly enhance the 
development of secondary markets;  and a good secondary market should strengthen channels for 
monetary policy operations, support financial market stability and-in the case of securities markets - 
reduce the costs of government financing,  as well as providing wider benefits to the economy as a 
whole.   The role for the central bank will vary over time, as the markets develop;  and its ability to play 
the role will depend very much on its expertise, efficiency and reputation. 
 
But it is important that the central bank bear in mind its high-level policy goals.  Market development 
initiatives should not distract it from, and certainly not run counter to, its high-level goals of monetary 
and financial stability.  And it is important to resist the temptation to force market development.  
Markets can be encouraged and enabled;  and obstacles to development can be removed-for instance, 
through infrastructure development.  But liquidity cannot be generated by administrative edict. 
 
It is also important to be realistic.  Small economies (in terms of wealth and population) with a low level 
of savings cannot support deep and liquid financial markets.  Sophisticated infrastructure and legislation 
will not create an underlying need to trade.   
 
 




                                                                      
 ANNEX 1:  AUCTION THEORY 
 
Auction theory typically distinguishes between common price (or single price) and multiple price (or 
bid price) auctions
71.  All successful bidders-those bidding at or above the cut-off price-in the former 
pay the cut-off price.  In the latter, successful bidders pay the price they bid.  Auction theory indicates 
that for a regular issuer of a homogenous good, revenue may be maximised by using the common price 
system, since it minimises ‘winner’s curse’.  ‘Winner’s curse’ assumes that the market price 
immediately after an auction is likely to be the cut-off price, since that is the price at which demand and 
supply meet;  and suggests that ‘successful’ bidders who have paid a higher price, in a multiple price 
auction, will therefore have paid too much, and so face a mark-to-market loss.  The risk (or reality) of 
loss means that some participants will bid a lower price (higher yield) under a multiple price system, 
with the effect that over time the demand curve shifts down (and maybe to the left). 
 
A central bank using an auction-whether of credit, deposits, central bank bills or of foreign exchange-as 
a monetary policy instrument, and with a secondary goal of developing markets, may have different 
objectives from those of a government issuing securities to finance a budget deficit (or re-finance 
maturing securities) where revenue maximisation is the prime aim.    Some goals-numbers 1 and 2 
below-point to a common price system;  but points 3 and 4 indicate that a multiple price system might 
work better for monetary operations. 
 
1.  A common price auction should reduce barriers to entry, by removing the winner’s curse, and 
so should encourage more competition and a broader market.  This may help strengthen the 
transmission mechanism. 
 
2.  In its monetary operations, a central bank may be less interested in revenue maximisation, and 
more in communicating to the market a particular price (interest rate or exchange rate) signal. 
 If the central bank fixes the price eg the interest rate at which it will provide/drain liquidity, 
the auction is effectively common price;  but it could set a minimum price and let the market 
bid a rate (as in the ECB’s Main Refinancing Operations), or select market bids at different 
prices and maturities (as in the US Fed’s OMO).  In longer-term transactions at a market price 
(for liquidity management rather than monetary policy purposes), the central bank could 
choose common or multiple price systems, but would not normally pre-determine the price. 
 
3.  A common price system could lead to an appearance of more volatile results.  In a thin 
market, where the auction might not be well covered and the yield curve/exchange rate is less 
certain, the weighted average allotment price (since all participants pay the same price) may 
fluctuate more than under a bid-price system.  This could matter more to a central bank, which 
is interested in policy signalling, than to a Ministry of Finance, interested in revenue 
maximisation.  A Ministry of Finance could vary the volume allotted in order to achieve an 
‘acceptable’ cut-off price.  The signal to the market is either:  the marginal yield bid is judged 
to be excessive, or that the Ministry would prefer, in the light of bidding, to fund itself at a 
different maturity.  But if a central bank varies the volume in order to influence the cut-off 
price, it is sending a monetary policy signal (the yield curve is too high), and it also weakens 
liquidity management.  Would a central bank be more inclined to reject a low, marginal bid in 
 
71 CCBS Handbook no. 11 - ‘Government securities:  Primary Issuance’ 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/handbooks/pdf/ccbshb11.pdf




a common price system than in a multiple price system? It is important that the system chosen 
does not result in the central bank giving unintended policy signals. 
 
4.  Large participants may not bid their ‘true’ price in a common price system:  they can bid high, 
in the expectation (though not certainty) that other bids will come in lower and set the price 
they actually pay;  large participants can also, therefore, dominate the auction more easily in a 
common price system, and may have less incentive to play an active role in the price 
formation process.  Some issuers-both central bank and Ministry of Finance-set limits on the 
amount that can be bid by individual participants in order to offset the risk of market 
dominance.   
 
A possible compromise might be to structure the auction such that all bids at or above the weighted 
average of successful bids, pay that weighted average price;  while successful bids below that price pay 
the price bid.  This softens the winner’s curse, and so should promote wide participation;  but leaves 
large/informed bidders with an incentive to participate actively in the price formation process and bid 




ANNEX 2:   THE HERFINDAHL INDEX - A MEASURE OF MARKET DOMINANCE   
 
 
The degree to which a market is dominated by one or a small number of participants can be measured 
using the ‘Herfindahl’ index.  This measure combines the number of market participants with their 
market share to give a single figure as a measure of market dominance:  it is the sum of the squares of 
all market shares eg for ten banks with market share of 10% each: 
 
market share square of market share
Bank 1 10% 0.010000
Bank 2 10% 0.010000
Bank 3 10% 0.01
Bank 4 10% 0.01
Bank 5 10% 0.01
Bank 6 10% 0.01
Bank 7 10% 0.01
Bank 8 10% 0.01
Bank 9 10% 0.01
Bank 10 10% 0.01
Herfindahl 0.1  
 
The index will yield a figure between one (if there is one market participant only, with therefore a 100% 
market share), to almost zero (thousands of participants with even market share).  The case of market 
dominance by two banks is shown below: 
market share square of market share
Bank 1 40% 0.160000
Bank 2 40% 0.160000
Bank 3 2.5% 0.000625
Bank 4 2.5% 0.000625
Bank 5 2.5% 0.000625
Bank 6 2.5% 0.000625
Bank 7 2.5% 0.000625
Bank 8 2.5% 0.000625
Bank 9 2.5% 0.000625
Bank 10 2.5% 0.000625
Herfindahl 0.325  
 
Interpreting the index 
 
If the index is below 0.1, the market would normally be viewed as competitive.   
Between 0.1 and 0.19, there may be market dominance.   
Above 0.2 there is likely to be market dominance. 
 
The definition of market share is of course important.  One bank may be large in terms of balance sheet 
size but with a small number of large loans on its balance sheet.  Another may have a far larger number 
of retail customer accounts. A third may originate a lot of capital market loans, but on-sell them and so 
have a relatively small balance sheet.  They may therefore dominate (or not) different areas of banking.  
Changes in the index may be as important as its level:  a market with a high index may be competitive, 
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